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INTRODUCTION
Until very recently, those who favored the legitimacy of humanitari-
an intervention were regarded either as hopeless idealists, or worse still,
as trigger-happy "moral imperialists." Yet, the doctrine of humanitarian
intervention has experienced a dramatic revival with the end of the Cold
War. The realignment of global political forces and the awareness of the
crucial link between human rights and peace have produced a significant
change of opinion among governments and writers on the subject. While
opinion is still sharply divided on the issue of unilateral humanitarian
intervention, most international actors and observers are rallying behind
the idea that the United Nations Security Council may, in appropriate
cases, act forcibly to remedy serious human rights deprivations and their
moral equivalents. In this article, I defend the legitimacy of collective
humanitarian intervention, particularly when authorized by the Security
Council.
* Professor of Law, Arizona State University. S.J.D., Northwestern University School of
Law (1987); Lic. Dr. Int'l, University of Brussels (1982); J.D., University of Buenos Aires
(1975). Many thanks to Tom Farer and David Wippman for their helpful comments on
previous drafts of this article.
Michigan Journal of International Law
The Charter of the United Nations prohibits the organization from
intervening "in matters which are essentially within the domestic juris-
diction of any state."' This limitation does not apply to the enforcement
measures taken by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Char-
ter. The prohibition in Article 2(7) is but one expression of the broader
duty not to intervene in matters that fall within the domestic jurisdiction
of sovereign states.2 But the principles and policies that govern unilater-
al intervention differ substantially from those that govern collective
intervention, especially when collective intervention is authorized by
international organizations such as the United Nations or the Organiza-
tion of American States.3
This article discusses collective intervention authorized by the
Security Council, with a special emphasis on the concept of exclusive
domestic jurisdiction. Part I first examines the different meanings of the
notoriously ambiguous word "intervention." Because the legitimacy of
collective intervention will depend in part on whether or not the matter
falls within the domestic jurisdiction of the target state, Part II will then
discuss contemporary views of domestic jurisdiction. Finally, Parts III
and IV discuss collective humanitarian intervention under the principles
of the U.N. Charter and examine the practice of the Security Council
since the end of the Cold War. This article concludes that international
law today recognizes, as a matter of practice, the legitimacy of collec-
tive forcible humanitarian intervention - of military measures autho-
rized by the Security Council for the purpose of remedying serious
human rights violations. While traditionally the only ground for collec-
tive military action has been the need to respond to breaches of the
peace, especially aggression, the international community now has
accepted a norm that allows collective humanitarian intervention to
respond to serious human rights abuses.
1. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, '1 7.
2. The traditional Cold War view of non-intervention is reflected, inter alia, in the
Declaration of Principles on International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Coopera-
tion Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625,
U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970).
3. See FERNANDO R. T s6N, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW
AND MORALITY 205-14 (1988). For a classic overview of the principle of non-intervention,
see ANN VAN WYNEN THOMAS & A.J. THOMAS, JR., NON-INTERVENTION (1956). See also
Tom J. Farer, The Regulation of Foreign Intervention in Civil Armed Conflict, 142 R.C.A.D.I.
291 (1974); the essays collected in INTERVENTION IN WORLD POLITICS (Hedley Bull ed.,
1984); and those in To LOOSE THE BANDS OF WICKEDNESS: INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION
IN DEFENCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS (Nigel S. Rodley ed., 1992).
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I. SOFT, HARD, AND FORCIBLE INTERVENTION
The customary meaning of prohibited intervention in international
law denotes "dictatorial interference ... in the affairs of another State
for the purpose of maintaining or altering the actual condition of
things."4 Prohibited intervention in internati6nal law involves, therefore,
some kind of coercive action. The International Court of Justice has
confirmed this definition of prohibited intervention. According to the
Court, acts of prohibited intervention must be coercive, and they must
be aimed at thwarting choices by the target state that must remain free
under international law.5 Thus the means of the intervention must be
coercive (although not necessarily forcible) and the end of the interven-
tion must be to influence another state (by effect of the coercion exer-
cised) on a matter falling under the state's domestic jurisdiction.6 Both
requirements must be met for an action to be called "prohibited inter-
vention" in this traditional sense.
Obviously, the word "intervene" in Article 2(7) cannot have this
meaning. Rather, that article prohibits any United Nations organ from
merely discussing, examining, or issuing recommendations on matters
that fall within the state's domestic jurisdiction. The prohibition in
Article 2(7) thus covers non-coercive action by the United Nations: the
word "intervene" is used here in its ordinary, non-technical sense, not as
a legal term of art. This is confirmed by the fact that Article 2(7) ex-
pressly exempts from the prohibition those cases where the organization
is entitled to take coercive enforcement measures under Chapter VII of
the U.N. Charter. Thus, in the context of United Nations law, we need
to ask two questions. First, what is the present scope of domestic juris-
diction removed from the scrutiny of the United Nations under Article
2(7)? Second, can the United Nations validly adopt coercive measures,
including force, to remedy a situation other than a breach of the peace
or act of aggression?
4. 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 305 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955); see
also C. ARELLANO GARCfA, DERECHO INTERNACIONAL P()BLICO 465-66 (1983).
5. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 14, 107-08 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua Case].
6. I have discussed these elements of intervention at some length in TEs6N, supra note 3,
at ch. 9.
7. See H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 166-73 (1950); see
also DiuRA NINI66, THE PROBLEM OF SOVEREIGNTY IN THE CHARTER AND IN THE PRACTICE
OF THE UNITED NATIONS 161-70 (1970); D.R. Gilmour, The Meaning of "Intervene" Within
Article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter - An Historical Perspective, 16 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 330 (1967).
Winter 1996]
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As a preliminary matter, it is necessary to distinguish between three
different meanings of "intervention," according to the degree of coercion
utilized in the attempt to influence other states. The first is the sense in
which the word is used in Article 2(7). In this sense, "intervention"
means simply discussion, examination, and recommendatory action: this
I will call soft intervention. The second meaning of the word "interven-
tion" refers to the adoption of measures that (unlike soft intervention)
are coercive but do not involve the use of force, such as economic and
other kinds of sanctions: this I will refer to as hard intervention. And
finally, the word "intervention" is often used to refer to acts involving
the use of force (as in "humanitarian intervention"): this I call forcible
intervention. The important issue regarding forcible intervention is that
the use of force is subject to independent legal constraints. Therefore, a
situation which could qualify for collective soft or hard intervention may
nevertheless not be appropriate for collective forcible action.
The distinction between the different forms of intervention according
to their degree of coercion leaves intact a common requirement: prohib-
ited intervention has to be an action aimed at influencing a government
on an issue where the target state has legal discretion. This is plain in
the case of soft intervention, where the only issue is an issue of ends,
not of means, since the means are perfectly permissible in principle. But
the same is true in cases of hard and forcible intervention. If state A
violates a fishing treaty with state B, and B adopts economic sanctions
in retaliation, B's action will not be deemed "intervention." The matter
did not fall within A's exclusive jurisdiction because A was not legally
free to violate the treaty. Instead, the legality of B's retaliation will be
determined by the law of countermeasures, in particular by the principle
of proportionality. If, however, state A decides to nationalize certain
natural resources, and B responds by declaring an economic embargo
against A, this action amounts to prohibited hard intervention. B's action
is coercive, although not forcible, and A has, in principle and absent an
international commitment, exclusive jurisdiction over the question of
nationalization of natural resources. In this example, B has no right to
coerce A into reversing the nationalization.
The same analysis applies to forcible intervention. Applying the
general requirements that define unlawful intervention, prohibited forc-
ible intervention will occur when two conditions are met: first, the
action by the intervenor can be described as indirect or direct use of
force; and second, the "choices" that the intervenor attempts to influence
should remain "free" for the target state - they must fall under its
[Vol. 17:323
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exclusive jurisdiction.8 The same two requirements must be met. If a
state violates a trade agreement with another state, and the latter retali-
ates with a limited forcible measure, this would violate the prohibition
on the use of force, since treaty breaches of this kind do not justify the
use of force. It would not violate the principle of non-intervention,
however, because actions concerning a treaty .are not within the legal
discretion of the target state. 9 The assessment of all three forms of
intervention depends on the determination of whether a matter falls
within the domestic jurisdiction of a state.
II. THE CONCEPT OF EXCLUSIVE DOMESTIC JURISDICTION
The concept of exclusive domestic jurisdiction has been the subject
of controversy both during the life of the League of Nations and in the
United Nations era. Two schools of thought compete. According to the
first one, there are matters that necessarily fall within the domestic
jurisdiction of states. The essence of sovereignty requires that certain
matters be left outside the reach of international law, particularly matters
broadly referred to as domestic policy.'0 Such matters definitely ought
not to be subject to action undertaken by international organizations.
According to this view, the concept of domestic jurisdiction does not
depend on the development of international law, because it is not rela-
tive but fixed, at least as long as we continue to live in a world of
sovereign states. The essential attributes of the sovereign state require
that certain matters be left to the state's own sovereign judgment. There
are, therefore, matters that fall essentially within the domestic jurisdic-
tion of states - just as the language of Article 2(7) suggests. Those
who defend the essentialist view give various versions of the content
and scope of domestic jurisdiction, but the common theme is that
8. I use the phrases "exclusive domestic jurisdiction" or "domestic" jurisdiction inter-
changeably, although technically those areas where the state is legally "free" may or may
not concern "domestic" matters. For example, choices regarding foreign policy are not
"domestic," but they may be legally discretionary and thus within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the state. For example, G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 2, prohibits intervention in the
internal or external affairs of other states. Although the issue is a general one of the
permissible limits of state influence, technically, only intervention in internal affairs gives
rise to issues of domestic jurisdiction.
9. If the aggrieved state responds instead by invading the wrongdoer (as opposed to
merely retaliating) this will of course be a violation of the principle of non-intervention as
well.
10. Most of the scholars in the pre-United Nations era favored this view. See, e.g., PAUL
FAUCHILLE, TRAITA DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 396-97 (1922); THEODORE WOOLSEY,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 50 (4th ed. 1874).
Winter 1996]
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matters pertaining to exclusive domestic jurisdiction are those that are
closely related to the sovereignty of the state."t
The second position is the legalist view of domestic jurisdiction.
Whether a matter falls within the state's domaine reserv, cannot be
determined by appealing to the notion of sovereignty, but is instead a
relative matter which depends on. the .state of international law at any
given time in history. 12 Thus, to cite the most notorious example of such
evolution, human rights were a matter of exclusive domestic jurisdiction
before 1945, but this is no longer the case today. 13 Where a rule of
international law regulates an issue, it automatically ceases to be a
matter of exclusive domestic jurisdiction for the states formally bound
by the rule. 4
There are problems with both positions. The essentialist view can
only be defended by appealing to an abstract and autonomous normative
conception of state sovereignty. The gist of the essentialist argument is
that certain matters ought not to be regulated by international law, come
what may. But this cannot be defended without providing a justification
of state sovereignty in the first place; otherwise the argument becomes
11. Thus, for example, a commentator opines that "[i]t has always been considered that
the constitutional, political, and social organization of a state is essentially a matter coming
under the latter's sovereignty, i.e. within its domestic jurisdiction." NINWn, supra note 7, at
186. The essentialist view is supported by the wording of Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter.
For the difference between the U.N. Charter and Article 15(8) of the League of Nations
Covenant, see the excellent discussion in HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
196-98 (1952). Some early commentators read Article 2(7) as leaving that decision to the
state concerned because, unlike the Covenant, Article 2(7) makes no reference to a United
Nations organ with powers to decide jurisdictional matters. See, e.g., id. As it turned out,
United Nations practice has not followed this interpretation. See ROSALYN HIGGINS, THE
DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED
NATIONS 65-67 (1963). See also Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of
a State to the United Nations, 1950 I.C.J. 4 (Mar. 3) (Article 2(7) no bar to rendering
advisory opinion).
12. The classic citation for this proposition is the dictum by the Permanent Court of
International Justice in the Nationality Decrees Advisory Opinion: "The question whether a
certain matter is or is not solely within the jurisdiction of a State is an essentially relative
question; it depends upon the development of international relations." Nationality Decrees in
Tunis and Morocco, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B), No. 4, at 24 (Feb. 7).
13. See infra, part II.A.
14. The International Court of Justice seems to have adopted an intermediate position.
For the Court, there is a presumption that a matter which is traditionally described as a matter
of domestic policy falls within the exclusive domestic jurisdiction of the state. See Nicaragua
Case, supra note 5, at 131. This approach is quite close to the essentialist view of domesticjurisdiction. That presumption, however, can be rebutted by a showing that the state has
bound itself internationally, through custom or treaty with respect to the issue. Id. at 131. This
view is a concession to the legalist position. Thus, the Court held that whether the govern-
ment is freely elected is a matter presumptively falling within the domestic jurisdiction of the
state, but that there is no principled obstacle to a state committing itself to holding free elec-
tions. Id. I have criticized the Court's view in Fernando R. Tes6n, Le Peuple, C'est Moi!: The
World Court and Human Rights, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 173 (1987). See infra, part II.B.
[Vol. 17:323
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circular - "exclusive domestic jurisdiction derives from the attributes
of sovereignty, and sovereignty consists of matters that are within the
state's exclusive domestic jurisdiction." The essentialist view is less a
theoretical explication of domestic jurisdiction than a moral injunction
to international actors not to intervene in matters thought to be closely
bound with the sovereignty of the state.'
At first blush, the legalist position seems closer to the truth. Indeed,
international law defines the boundaries of state sovereignty. Yet the
problem with the legalist position is that, without more, it is tautologi-
cal. It simply says that domestic jurisdiction ends where international
jurisdiction begins. This is true but trivial: where exactly does interna-
tional jurisdiction take over? At least the essentialist view had some,
perhaps unattractive, suggestions about substance.. Legalism needs to
provide a criterion to decide which matters fall within the state's exclu-
sive domestic jurisdiction, and the answer will depend on the operational
definition of international law. Only custom and treaties count in a
strictly positivist view of international law. By contrast, moral princi-
ples, purposes, and policies also count in a more teleological view of
international law. Domestic jurisdiction swells or shrinks accordingly. 6
I will not attempt to give a complete answer to this jurisprudential
controversy here, except by saying that the "substantial international
effects" policy seems outmoded today. To buttress this conclusion, I will
review a number of areas where the concept of domestic jurisdiction has
undergone spectacular transformations in recent years. Areas which have
traditionally been claimed by states as falling within their domaine
reservi are now unequivocally subject to review by international bodies,
and to soft and hard intervention by international organizations.
15. The essentialist view of domestic jurisdiction is thus a version of anti-cosmopolitan
nationalism, and it will, stand or fall with it. If, for example, one believes that state sovereign-
ty is not autonomous or original, but instead derived from more basic moral principles such
as individual dignity and human rights, then the essentialist view of domestic jurisdiction in
this all-or-nothing form is harder to defend. I defend a derivative concept of sovereignty in
FERNANDO R. TE6N, THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Westview Press, forthcom-
ing). If one has a derivative definition of state sovereignty, one can make distinctions re-
garding state sovereignty and the conditions under which it has normative weight against for-
eign intervention. These distinctions will be based, perhaps, on different degrees of domestic
legitimacy.
16. Some writers clearly have seen this weakness of the legalist position. It is not enough
to say that domestic jurisdiction ends where international jurisdiction starts; nor is it possible
to say that the United Nations organs may decide the issue on a case-by-case basis. A policy
or principle is needed to decide in individual cases whether a matter is within the domestic
jurisdiction of states. Professor Rosalyn Higgins, in her seminal discussion of domestic
jurisdiction thirty years ago, proposed the policy that "states must be made responsible to the
international community when their actions cause substantial international effects." HIGGINS,
supra note 11, at 62.
Winter 19961
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A. Human Rights
Human rights have long been subtracted from the exclusive domes-
tic jurisdiction of states. This is notwithstanding the fact that they seem
to constitute the paradigm of an "essentially" domestic matter since they
define the relationship between government and subjects. Writers al-
ready had reached this conclusion in the early discussions of the concept
of domestic jurisdiction in the U.N. Charter, citing not only the well-
known provisions of the Charter, but also a number of human rights
cases that had been addressed by the various organs of the United
Nations. "7
The proposition that human rights are no longer a matter of exclusive
domestic jurisdiction is indisputable, independently of the legal grounds
for the obligation of states to respect human rights.' 8 The General As-
sembly routinely adopts resolutions concerning human rights. Many are
addressed to the membership in general, but some are addressed directly
to particular states. Thus the General Assembly recently passed resolu-
tions on the human rights situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina; 9 El Salva-
dor;2° Iraq;21 Myanmar (formerly Burma);22 Afghanistan;23 territories
occupied by Israel;24 Haiti;25 and Iran.26 Admittedly, some of these cases,
such as the "intifada" in the territories occupied by Israel or the situation
17. See, e.g., HIGGINS, supra note 11; Felix Ermacora, Human Rights and Domestic
Jurisdiction, 124 R.C.A.D.I. 371, 436 (1968-II). The most famous case is the case of South
Africa which, contrary to the widespread opinion that the basis for the exercise of United
Nations powers was the "international effects" test, is and was a human rights case. Maintain-
ing and enforcing a system of apartheid is not a valid "domestic jurisdiction" choice for a'
state, regardless of whether it is deemed to produce international effects.
18. See generally Burns Weston, Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD
COMMUNITY 14 (Richard P. Claude & Bums H. Weston eds., 2d ed. 1992).
19. G.A. Res. 242, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Agenda Item 150, U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/242
(1992).
20. G.A. Res. 133, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Agenda Item 98, U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/133
(1992).
21. G.A. Res. 134, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Agenda Item 98, U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/134
(1992).
22. G.A. Res. 132, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Agenda Item 98, U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/132
(1992).
23. G.A. Res. 136, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Agenda Item 98, U.N. Doc. AIRES/46/136
(1992).
24. G.A. Res. 76, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Agenda Item 33, U.N. Doc. A/RES/46176
(1992).
25. G.A. Res. 7, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Agenda Item 145, U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/7
(1991).
26. G.A. Res. 173, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Agenda Item 12, U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/173
(1991).
[Vol. 17:323
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in Afghanistan, do produce substantial international effects and can
therefore be explained by reference to the traditional test. The General
Assembly seldom offers this rationale, however. In the case of Myanmar,
the General Assembly simply recalled that states have an obligation to
promote and protect human rights in accordance with the applicable
international human rights instruments.27 In the case of El Salvador,
although a civil war of serious regional repercussions was taking place,
the General Assembly could not overemphasize the importance of
observing human rights, "full respect of which is essential to the attain-
ment of a just and lasting peace." No references to international repercus-'
sions are cited in the case of Haiti either. In those cases of human rights
violations that do threaten international peace and security, such as
apartheid in South Africa, action by the United Nations is legally
overdetermined: the "international effects" test and the human rights
violations provide equally valid grounds for soft intervention.
That human rights violations warrant United Nations soft intervention
has ceased to be a matter of controversy. Governments singled out by the
General Assembly rarely claim nowadays that such action violates Article
2(7) of the U.N. Charter. Because the General Assembly treats the
Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as establishing
definite obligations for members, violations of such obligations can
trigger action by the appropriate United Nations body.
B. Form of Government: Democracy
Many writers and governments who accept the premise that the
observance of human rights, in the sense of a government's treatment of
its own citizens, is now an appropriate subject for international scrutiny,
nonetheless draw the line at the question of the legitimacy of the gov-
ernment itself. They argue that this is a question of domestic jurisdiction,
if there ever was one. In the absence of widespread human rights viola-
tions, so the argument goes, the international community should not be
in the business of passing judgment on the legitimacy of the origin of a
government.2" The question of internal political legitimacy is, in this
view, a matter falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the state and
exempt from even soft intervention by international organizations or by
the international community as a whole.
27. G.A. Res. 132, supra note 22, at 1.
28. This was the virtually unanimous view before 1948. See Gregory H. Fox, The Right
to Political Participation in International Law, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 539, 549-69 (1992).
Winter 1996]
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There are a priori reasons to doubt the conclusion that international
law is or should not be concerned with democratic legitimacy. First and
fundamental is the question of agency. If international law is largely
created by nation-states, then the international community needs some
criterion to determine when some official actually represents the state.
Traditional international law has proposed the criterion of effectiveness.
A government is the international representative of a people living in a
territory if that government has effective political control over- that
people.29 Traditional international law is indifferent to how that political
control has been acquired.
Such a view is indefensible. If the international system is going to be
the result of what the "peoples of the United Nations" want it to be,30
then it makes sense to require that the government participating in the
creation of international law be the real representative of the people who
reside within the state's boundaries. A rule requiring democratic legiti-
macy in the form of free adult universal suffrage seems the best approx-
imation to actual political consent and true representativeness.
Second, there are strong grounds for believing that democratic rule
is a necessary condition for enjoying other human rights. While it is
always .possible to imagine a society where human rights are respected
by an enlightened despot, this has never occurred in practice., This is why
the right to political participation is included in the major human rights
conventions.3 1 The right to participate in government is a very important
human right in itself; it is also instrumental to the enjoyment of other
rights. Its violation should therefore trigger appropriate international
scrutiny.
The third reason for requiring democratic rule is the one indicated by
Kant: democracies are more peaceful, and therefore a rule requiring
democratic rule is consonant with the ideal of a lasting world peace, in
a way that the rule of effectiveness, by countenancing tyranny, is not. 2
29. The classical view is summarized in RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
§ 210 cmt. d (1985).
30. See U.N. CHARTER pmbl.
31. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted on Dec. 19, 1966,
art. 25, 99 U.N.T.S. 171, 179; American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, art. 23,
36 O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, at 1, O.A.S. Doc. OAFSer.L/V/II.23, doc. 21, rev. 6, reprinted in 9
I.L.M. 673, 682 (1970); Protocol to the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 262, 264; African Charter on
Human and Peoples' Rights, art. 13, 21 I.L.M. 59, 61 (1982).
32. I summarize here the argument I made in Fernando R. Tes6n, The Kantian Theory of
International Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 53, 74-81 (1992). The argument relies on the seminal
research by Michael W. Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs (Part 1), 12 PHIL.
[Vol, 17:323
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This is because tyrannies tend to be more aggressive and because the
difference in regimes is a major cause of conflict. Democracies have
built-in mechanisms which cause them to avoid war with one another
altogether. The reason why democracies are sometimes belligerent is that
they often perceive threats to their democratic institutions by illiberal
regimes. These threats are sometimes real and sometimes imaginary,
which is why democracies also get involved in unjustified wars. But
these wars are always against illiberal regimes. Democracies do not make
war against one another. If the aim of international law is to secure a
lasting peace where the benefits of international cooperation can be
reaped by all, then international law has to require democratic legitimacy.
But even if none of this was true, international law should require
democratic rule simply because it is the right thing to do. I do not need
a complicated philosophical defense of democracy: a simple comparison
with the traditional rule of effectiveness will suffice. Traditional interna-
tional law authorizes tyranny. It gives carte-blanche to anyone who
wishes to bypass popular will and seize and maintain power by sheer
political force. This is delicately described by pertinent international
materials as a state's right to "choose" its political system. 33 Such a state-
centric view suffers from acute moral and conceptual poverty. Both
ordinary common sense morality and the structure of international law,
by presupposing agency and representation, require that governments
should be recognized and accepted in the international community only
if they genuinely represent their people.
These arguments iuffice, I believe, to demonstrate why international
law must recognize an individual and collective right to democratic rule.
It has become abundantly clear, moreover, that the principle is supported
by contemporary state practice. 4 Professor Thomas Franck's findings are
well-known and I am content to rest on them here. I will briefly discuss,
however, two precedents: the International Court of Justice's discussion
of democracy in the Nicaragua Case and the resolution on democracy
adopted by the United Nations General Assembly.
In spite of some remarkable precedents, the principle of democratic
rule has been slow to make headway as a universally accepted principle,
& PUB. AFF. 205, 213 (1983); Michael W. Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs
(Part 2), 12 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 323 (1983).
33. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 2, at 123 ("Every State has an inalienable right
to choose its political .. system .... ").
34. See generally Fox, supra note 28; see also Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right
to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 46 (1992).
-Winter .19961
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until recently. 35 The main reason, was, of course, the Cold War. The
uncertainty and ambivalence of the principle of democratic rule during
the Cold War years was demonstrated by the International Court of
Justice as recently as 1986.36 The Court, while accepting that a state may
bind itself by treaty or other formal commitment to hold free elections,
held that every state "is free to decide upon the principle and methods of
popular consultation," this being part of a "fundamental right to choose
and implement its own political, economic, and social systems. '37 This
includes the "freedom" to be undemocratic, which was precisely the issue
the Court was addressing. If other states suspect that a country is sliding
toward totalitarianism, according to the Court, there is not much they can
do, because "adherence by a State to any particular doctrine does not
constitute a violation of customary international law; to hold otherwise
would make nonsense of the principle of state sovereignty. As I have
argued elsewhere, the Court's position is indefensible today.39 Its rejec-
tion of the principle of democratic rule in the Americas was outdated
even in 1986; it is bad general international law in 1996. Whatever the
other merits of the decision, the Court's discussion of democracy in the
Nicaragua Case should be buried along with other Cold War relics.
In the United Nations, the movement toward recognition of demo-
cratic rule was cautious but unmistakable. On February 21, 1991, the
General Assembly adopted Resolution 45/150, entitled "Enhancing the
Effectiveness of the Principle of Periodic and Genuine Elections."'
While this resolution still reflects some of the ambivalence associated
with the tension between sovereignty and human rights, it is an important
document. The resolution reaffirms the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. It provides, albeit vaguely, that "everyone has the right to take
35. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967); and its Optional Protocol, opened for
signature Dec. 19, 1966, art. 1, 999 U.N.T.S. 302. Under the Optional Protocol, the Human
Rights Committee held that Uruguay's military regime was in violation of Article 19(2) of the
Covenant (which states that everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression, including
the freedom to seek, receive, and impart information) when it denied a petitioner the right to
freely engage in political and trade union activities. Alba Pietroria v. Uruguay, Communication
R. 10/44, Report of the Human Rights Committee, 36 U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 40,
at 153-59, U.N. Doc. A/46/40 (1981). The other important Cold War precedent is also found
in the Americas. It is the historical resolution by the Council of Ministers of the Organization
of American States in 1979 declaring the illegality of the Somoza regime in Nicaragua and
calling for its immediate replacement. For this and further examples, see Franck, supra note
34, at 62-65.
36. See Nicaragua Case, supra note 5.
37. Id. at 131.
38. Id. at 133.
39. See Tes6n, supra note 14.
40. G.A. Res. 150, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., at 457-59, U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/150 (1991).
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part in the government of his or her country." More fundamentally, it
affirms that "the will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of
government[,]" and that "this will shall be expressed in periodic and
genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and
shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures."
This very specific and detailed content of the principle of democratic rule
is reiterated throughout the resolution.
The resolution, however, also warns that these efforts to enhance
democracy "should not call into question each State's sovereign right
freely to choose and develop its political, social, economic, and cultural
systems, whether or not they conform to the preferences of other states."
Members have a duty, according to the resolution, to respect the "deci-
sions taken by other states in freely choosing and developing their
electoral institutions." The word "freely" in this context seems to mean
"free from foreign coercion," and not necessarily "free from domestic
coercion." How can this statement be squared with the requirement of
democracy and free elections? While on the one hand a state has the
right to choose its own political system without interference from other
states, on the other hand it seems obvious that under the terms of the
resolution a state cannot "freely choose" to be undemocratic, even though
an undemocratic regime is a "political system."
The way to reconcile these two parts of the resolution is this: the
''sovereignty" limitation contained in this resolution refers to the need to
tolerate a diversity of actual electoral procedures in the domestic prac-
tice of members. The core of the principle remains intact, however: states
have an obligation to make sure that governments are elected by the
people in free elections. Many electoral systems and methods are com-
patible with this principle, but an undemocratic regime is not. Thus a
state cannot validly choose an undemocratic regime or tyranny.
To summarize: There can be little doubt that a principle of demo-
cratic rule is today part of international law. While in a universal context
the recognition of the principle has only had the effect of subtracting the
question of democratic rule from the exclusive jurisdiction of states, the
nations in Europe and the Americas have elevated the principle of
democracy to the category of a rule which is fully enforceable through
appropriate regional collective mechanisms.4'
41. I do not pass judgment here on the unilateral enforcement of democracy (the cases of
Grenada and Panama are possible examples). See generally TEs6N, supra note 3. But those
precedents, especially when added to the Haitian case, at the very least reinforce the proposi-
tion that democratic rule is no longer part of the domestic jurisdiction of states.
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III. COLLECTIVE HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
A. General Principles
In recent years, international lawyers have debated the legitimacy of
using force to remedy serious human rights violations, a practice also
known as humanitarian intervention.42 Some writers reject the legitimacy
of humanitarian intervention altogether, whether it is collective or unilat-
eral.4' For these authors, the intent of the intervenor is irrelevant, as are
the degree of human rights violations and the attitude of the victims
themselves - that is, whether the intervention is the product of a unilat-
eral decision by the intervenor, or instead requested by the citizens of the
target state. According to these authors, armed intervention for humani-
tarian purposes is flatly prohibited.
Undeniably, the anti-interventionist position has the support of
traditional state-centric conceptions of international law and relations."
It is also informed by the commendable moral purpose of reducing the
permissible instances of war and containing armed conflict. This extreme
position cannot be maintained today. The content and purpose of state
sovereignty have undergone profound changes since 1945, and more
dramatically since 1989. Human beings have claims against their own
states and governments that the international community cannot merely
ignore. While war ought to be the remedy of last resort to redress human
rights violations, there are some, admittedly rare, serious cases of human
rights deprivations where a strong case can and should be made for
forcible intervention authorized by the international community or even
by individual states. Whether these cases should be viewed as extreme
instances of "moral catastrophe" and thus outside the law, or whether
they are instead genuine exceptions to the legal prohibition is a jurispru-
dential preference to which little weight ought to be attached. I cannot
see much consequence to the proposition that an act is illegal but morally
42. For those who argue against humanitarian intervention, see TEs6N, supra note 3, at
128 n.5. For those who argue for humanitarian intervention, see id., at 129 n.7.
43. See, in addition to authors referenced supra note 42, Lori F Damrosch, Commentary
on Collective Military Intervention to Enforce Human Rights, in LAW AND FORCE IN THE NEW
INTERNATIONAL ORDER 215, 217-21 (Lori F. Damrosch & David J. Scheffler eds., 1991);
Louis Henkin, The Use of Force: Law and U.S. Policy, in Louis HENKIN ET AL., RIGHT V.
MIGHT: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 37, 41-44 (2d ed. 1991).
44. See, e.g., Thomas Oppermann, Intervention, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 233, 235 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1987) ("[T]he raison d'etre of the non-interven-
tion rule is the protection of the sovereignty of the State.").
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permitted, or obligatory, 45 as contrasted with the proposition that the act
is legally permitted, or obligatory, in those rare instances. This is so
because moral reasons are overriding. If anti-interventionists can agree on
the kind of cases where the international community morally can or must
intervene, their protests that the intervention is nevertheless illegal do not
enjoy much credibility.
State practice since 1945 demonstrates that states have a right to
intervene forcibly to put an end to serious human rights violations.' Yet,
here I wish to concentrate exclusively on collective humanitarian inter-
vention. In more technical terms, the question is whether the Security
Council may authorize Article 42 measures to put an end to serious, or
extreme, human rights violations. Some writers who are hostile to the
legitimacy of unilateral action concede that the legal situation changes
when the humanitarian intervention is authorized by the United Nations
or an appropriate regional body.47 This support for multilateral action
may be prompted by the feeling that if a coercive action is authorized by
some kind of formal international process, such as voting by the Security
Council, then it acquires a legality which it would lack if the decision to
intervene were left to national governments acting unilaterally. Alterna-
tively, they may think that collective humanitarian intervention is more
apt to curb the danger of abuse posed by unilateral intervention.48 More
technically, some may argue that the Security Council, unlike individual
states, has absolute discretion in deciding when to authorize the use of
force. According to this view, the Security Council determines the
existence of a breach of the peace, threat to the peace, or act of aggres-
45. An example of this position, is Tom J. Farer, Human Rights in Law's Empire: The
Jurisprudence War, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 117 (1991) (while sympathetic to intervention in cases
of brutal repression, the U.N. Charter does not authorize unilateral humanitarian intervention).
46. See TES6N, supra note 3, at ch. 8.
47. See, e.g., Jost Delbrtlck, A Fresh Look at Humanitarian Intervention Under the
Authority of the United Nations, 67 IND. L.J. 887 (1993); Vladimir Kartashkin, Human Rights
and Humanitarian Intervention, in LAW AND FORCE IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER,
supra note 43, at 202, 208. While reluctantly believing that unilateral humanitarian intervention
is banned by the U.N. Charter, Tom Farer has a more sympathetic view of collective humani-
tarian intervention. See, Farer, supra note 45; see also Tom J. Farer, An Inquiry into the
Legitimacy of Humanitarian Interveniion, in LAW AND FORCE IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL
ORDER, supra note 43, at 185, 191, 198-99.
48. See, e.g., Nancy D. Arnison, International Law and Non-Intervention: When do
Humanitarian Concerns Supersede Sovereignty?, 17 FLETCHER FORUM WORLD AFF. 199, 201
(1993) (collective humanitarian intervention preferable to unilateral action, although collective
action may also suffer from potential for abuse and mixed motives); Barry M. Benjamin, Note,
Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention: Legalizing the Use of Force to Prevent Human Rights
Atrocities, 16 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 120 (1993) (an inherent problem with unilateral interven-
tion is that it may be done for self-interest or political gain, although this may be more closely
monitored by modem technology).
Winter 1996]
Michigan Journal of International Law
sion under Article 39 of the U.N. Charter. Therefore, if the Security
Council authorizes enforcement measures in a case of serious human
rights deprivations, it has determined that the situation qualifies under
Article 39 as the kind of situation which is a breach of the peace.49
Anti-interventionists disagree. They argue that under Article 39 the
Security Council can only authorize collective forcible action in cases of
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, and acts of aggression.5' Serious
human rights violations, even genocide, do not constitute aggression or
threat or breach of the (international) peace if contained within state
borders. In addition, anti-interventionists deny absolute discretion to the
Security Council in this regard. For them, the Security Council is subject
to standards imposed by the U.N. Charter and cannot lawfully overstep
those constraints.5 Unless a violation of human rights threatens interna-
tional peace, the Security Council does not have the power to authorize
forcible action. At most, these authors argue, the Security Council can
criticize the dictatorial government and demand peremptorily that the
violations cease. Such a demand will be legally binding under Article 25.
The Security Council can even authorize hard intervention, such as
economic or other sanctions, by members against the outlaw state.52 But
these authors maintain that the Security Council may not authorize the
use of force.
The first question is whether the Security Council has complete
discretion to interpret Article 39 and thus authorize the use of force
without being formally constrained by the language of that article. Those
who respond in the affirmative say that what the Security Council says
is a breach of the peace is legally a breach of the peace. This position,
however, must be rejected. The Security Council, like any other United
Nations organ, is bound by the principles, rules, and standards set forth
in the U.N. Charter. Its actions, therefore, are subject to legal scrutiny,
49. See, e.g., PETER MALANCZUCK, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE LEGITIMACY
OF THE USE OF FORCE 25 (1993) (decision on what constitutes "threat to peace" a political one
subject to Security Council's discretion).
50. See, e.g., Theodor Meron, Commentary on Humanitarian Intervention, in LAW AND
FORCE IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER, supra note 43, at 212, 212-13. In the same
volume, Professor Damrosch finds the arguments for collective humanitarian intervention
stronger than those for unilateral action, but still not free from doubt. See Damrosch, supra
note 43, at 219.
51. This was the position taken by Libya in the Lockerbie Case. See Questions of
Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial
Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.S.), 1992 I.C.J. 114, 126 (Provisional Measures Order of
Apr. 14), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 665, 671 (1992) [hereinafter Lockerbie Case].
52. This was the case of Haiti before resolution 940. There the Security Council imposed
economic sanctions under Article 41. The Haiti case is fully discussed below. See infra, part
III.D.
[Vol. 17:323
Collective Humanitarian Intervention
both substantively and procedurally.53 Those who vindicate the absolute
discretion of the Security Council confuse two different meanings of
discretion.' One meaning of discretion arises when an official's decision,
authorized by law, is not subject to review by a higher body. This is a
weak meaning of the word "discretion," because it does not presuppose
that the law lacks standards to guide the official's decision. That decision
is perhaps non-reviewable, but it may not be lawless; it is controlled by
substantive legal standards. The second meaning of discretion is that the
official's decision is not guided by any standards, that he has absolute
power to decide one way or the other, unconstrained by law (except, of
course, by the rule of competence that empowered him as the legitimate
authority). This is discretion in a strong sense, because it conceives of
the official as deciding the case anew, as creating fresh law. The differ-
ence between the two is very important. In the first case the official's
decision is vulnerable to the criticism that he applied the law incorrectly,
that the decision is legally wrong. In the second case, however, the
official is not open to the criticism that he misapplied the law, because
the official's decision is not substantively constrained. He is deemed to
be authorized to create fresh law for the case.
It is reasonable to suppose that under the Charter, the Security
Council enjoys, at most, discretion in the first, weak, sense. Under the
Charter, neither the General Assembly nor the International Court of
Justice have original or plenary jurisdiction to review the decisions of the
Security Council." But the Security Council has no discretion in the
strong sense. Its decisions are constrained by international law, in partic-
ular by the U.N. Charter, and thus subject to the judgment of legality by
governments and international lawyers generally, even if its decisions are
not formally subject to review. Anti-interventionists are right, therefore,
in rejecting the view that the Security Council can decree a collective
intervention for any reason. There is a substantive law of collective use
of force, and the Security Council is just as bound to comply with it as
anybody else.
53. For a general discussion of the legitimacy of the Security Council decisions (mostly
from a procedural standpoint), see David J. Caron, The Legitimacy of the Collective Authority
of the Security Council, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 552 (1993).
54. The discussion that follows is taken from the seminal work by RONALD DWORKIN,
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 31-39 (1978).
55. Although, as the Lockerbie Case demonstrates, the International Court of Justice may,
in appropriate cases, be called to pass upon the legality of the Security Council's actions. See
Lockerbie Case, supra note 51, at 126-27 (ruling only that Security Council decisions prevail
over contrary treaty obligations by virtue of Article 103 of the Charter; thus not excluding the
possibility that the Council may act ultra vires).
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Simply echoing the uncontroversial proposition that human rights are
no longer part of the exclusive domestic jurisdiction of states is not an
effective response to anti-interventionists.5 6 Anti-interventionists rightly
respond that this affects soft and perhaps even hard intervention. They
happily concede that United Nations organs, including the Security
Council, may address human rights issues, and even condemn states for
their human rights abuses, as long as no use of force is involved. They
correctly point out that the collective use of force is subject to indepen-
dent constraints, which are to be found in Chapter VII. Thus, Article 39,
and not the chameleon Article 2(7), is the right place to look when
evaluating the legitimacy of collective forcible intervention.57
A complete answer to the anti-interventionist view draws from text,
morality, history, and practice. There is some textual support in the
Charter for the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention. 5' The Preamble
declares that armed force should not be used "save in the common inter-
est," and there is no reason to assume that the common interest excludes
the interest in upholding human rights, particularly since the "Peoples of
the United Nations" reaffirm "faith in fundamental human rights [and] in
the dignity and worth of the human person" in the Preamble itself.59 The
Preamble also states the United Nations' determination "to establish
conditions under which ... justice ... can be maintained." It would be
a very narrow definition of justice indeed which would not include
human rights in any context - let alone in this one - where human
rights are one of the pillars of the organization.
In addition, the anti-interventionist's reading of Article 39 and Chap-
ter VII is too narrow, and not supported by United Nations and state
practice. 6° Subsequent practice under the Charter, if unchallenged on the
whole, may determine the more precise meaning of the words in the
Charter.6' Admittedly, the language drafted almost fifty years ago limits
the authorization of forcible action to cases of threat or breach of the
(international) peace or acts of aggression. This limitation can be easily
understood in historical terms, since the possibility of genuine collective
action to respond to and prevent aggression was already a revolutionary
step.
56. See, e.g., Judy A. Gallant, Humanitarian Intervention and Security Council Resolution
688: A Reappraisal in Light of A Changing World Order, 7 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 881
(1992).
57. See MALANCZUK, supra note 49, at 25.
58. I have argued that the text of the Charter is inconclusive on this issue. See TEs6N,
supra note 3, at ch. 7. I draw from that discussion.
59. See id. at 133.
60. See infra part III.B-F.
61. A well-known example is, of course, the voting practice in the Security Council.
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The legitimacy of collective humanitarian intervention in appropriate
cases flows from an interpretation of the U.N. Charter that looks, beyond
the letter, to the purposes and principles that animate, shape, and define
legitimacy in the international community today. I am not suggesting one
play verbal games on this very important issue. Indeed, it is always
possible to define serious human rights violations as a breach of the
peace and thus trigger enforcement action under Article 39. I am sug-
gesting that the substantive law of the Charter has now evolved to
include human rights as a centerpiece of the international order, and
cases of serious human rights violations as situations that may warrant
collective enforcement action. This imperative prevails over unrestrained
state sovereignty, and may be enforced by the Security Council, acting
on behalf of the international community, in rare cases of serious human
rights violations where other means have failed or are certain to fail.
There are, of course, cases where even anti-interventionists would agree
that serious violations of human rights can trigger enforcement action,
namely, where those violations do constitute a "threat to the peace." 62
This happens quite often, as in the cases of South Africa or Iraq's
treatment of the Kurds.63 As a consequence, it is possible to argue that
the basis for collective humanitarian intervention is the threat to peace,
and not the gravity of the human rights violations. In this view, the
United Nations has a right to intervene only when human rights depriva-
tions cause international effects. 64 Presumably, genocidal action is beyond
the reach of the Security Council's action when it is purely internal, that
is, its effects are contained within a state's borders.
There is no practical problem with the Security Council actually
invoking the language of Article 39 when deciding to authorize humani-
tarian intervention. In my view, the crucial question is what the Security
Council does, not what it says. Suppose there are massive human rights
violations and the Security Council decides to intervene. When doing so,
it uses the "threat to the peace" or "breach of the peace" language of
Article 39. Let us suppose this becomes an institutional habit. It is
intolerably formalistic to cling to the view, on these facts, that the
Security Council is not authorizing humanitarian intervention, when a
commonsense reading of the situation by any unprejudiced observer will
62. See, inter alia, Kartashkin, supra note 47, at 218.
63. See infra part III.B.
64. See, e.g., Nigel S. Rodley, Collective Intervention to Protect Human Rights and
Civilian Populations: The Legal Framework, in To LOOSE THE BANDS OF WICKEDNESS, supra
note 3, at 14, 28, 40 (although winds may be blowing in direction of collective humanitarian
intervention, threat to international peace will probably be required).
Winter 1996]
Michigan Journal of International Law
indicate that that is precisely what the Security Council is doing. The
better interpretation is that, regardless of the language in which it cloaks
its decision, the Security Council authorizes the use of force in two
instances: to counter aggression and restore peace, and to remedy serious
human rights abuses. In both situations, the Security Council will autho-
rize the use of force only in rare and extreme cases where everything
else has proved ineffective or unavailable.
Moreover, the anti-interventionist position is peculiarly blind to
history. The United Nations was created as a response to the horrors
caused by one of the most tyrannical regimes in modem history. The
Second World War was in part a humanitarian effort. It is therefore
surprising to be told that the very crimes that prompted the massive,
cruel, and costly struggle from which the United Nations was born, are
now immune from action by the organ entrusted to preserving the fruits
of the hard-won peace. The formalism of anti-interventionists thus not
only rewards tyrants, but it betrays the purposes of the very international
order that they claim to protect. Some may find the concerns of the anti-
interventionist persuasive enough to severely limit or reject the lawful-
ness of unilateral humanitarian intervention. But those concerns have
little force against humanitarian intervention properly authorized by the
United Nations Security Council.
The reasons of political philosophy that support the legitimacy of
humanitarian intervention are many and complex, and I have discussed
them elsewhere at length. 65 The central point is that states derive their
legitimacy and their sovereignty from popular consent and the protection
of basic human rights. The purpose of states is to protect human rights
in the first place. Therefore, governments forfeit their legitimacy in the
international arena when they turn against their citizens and betray the
ethical end that justifies their existence. In some cases, therefore, forcible
humanitarian intervention is morally permitted, although subject to
several constraints. These reasons gain in strength when the intervention
is collective, for in that case a number of concerns about intervention are
assuaged - in particular the concern about the dangers of unilateral
abuse.'
65. See Th6N&, supra note 3, at Part One.
66. See, e.g., Lee H. Hamilton, When It's Our Duty to Intervene, WASH. POST, Aug. 9,
1992, at C2 ("multilateral consideration would guard against aggression, prevent hasty or
capricious intervention and enhance the effectiveness of subsequent action").
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B. The Case of Iraq's Treatment of the Kurds, 1991
These textual, historical, and moral arguments are validated by recent
practice. On August 3, 1990, armored and mechanized units from the
Iraqi Army's Republican Guard divisions invaded and occupied the
neighboring nation of Kuwait. In early 1991 the Security Council autho-
rized the use of force to terminate Iraq's occupation of Kuwait. While
rather unique in its scope and intensity, the collective military action
taken by United Nations member states in "Operation Desert Storm" can
be addressed within the traditional interpretation of the principles set
forth in Articles 39, 41 and 42 of the U.N. Charter.
During the coalition military campaign President George Bush had
publicly expressed optimism that Iraqi citizens would "take matters into
their own hands" and remove Saddam Hussein from power.67 The
crushing defeat of the Iraqi Army in and around Kuwait, and public
exhortations from foreign leaders to throw off Saddam Hussein's rule,
reignited long-simmering desires for independence among Kurds living
in Northern Iraq.6s Although the Iraqi Army was no match for the allied
coalition, it proved more than effective at suppressing the Kurdish revolt.
Iraqi army troops and helicopter gunships relentlessly attacked Kurdish
villages, forcing two million civilians to flee into the countryside. Almost
one million of these Kurds fled north, through the mountains, in an
attempt to reach safety in Turkey.69
On April 5, 1991, as atrocities committed by the Iraqi government
against the Kurds and others mounted,7" the Security Council adopted
67. RICK ATKINSON, CRUSADE: THE ALLIED VICTORY IN THE PERSIAN GULF 303 (1993).
68. Howard Adelman, Humanitarian Intervention: The Case of the Kurds, 4 INT'L J.
REFUGEE L. 4, 5-7 (1992). Kurds constitute 23-27 percent of the Iraqi population and are
concentrated in the northern area of Iraq. Conflict between Arabs and Kurds in Iraq is decades
old. For example, a Kurdish revolt occurred in 1974 when a 1970 autonomy agreement
between Iraqi Kurds and Saddam Hussein's Ba'th regime broke down. The rebellion was
finally crushed by Saddam Hussein in 1975 at a cost of 50,000 killed. Guerilla warfare
resumed in the 1980s, however, and after the Iran-Iraq war ended in 1988, the Iraqi army
killed thousands of Kurdish nationalists and used poison gas against the population of the
Kurdish village of Hallabja. Id.
69. Id. at 7.
70. See Kevin McKiernan, Kurdistan's Season of Hope, L.A. TIMES MAG., Aug. 23, 1992,
at 28; Jonathan C. Randal, Against All Odds: Resistance to Saddam, WASH. POST, Apr. 7,
1991, at Al. More recent evidence suggests that Iraq continues to violate this Resolution,
inflicting serious human rights violations against the Shiite Muslim civilians in southern Iraq,
as well as continuing to attack the Kurds in the north. Art Pine & Robin Wright, U.N. Aide
Cites "Serious" Violations of Human Rights in Southern Iraq, L.A. TIMES, July 31, 1992, at
A6. In addition, confiscated Iraqi materials have provided comprehensive documentation of
massive human rights violations. Thorough paper, audio, and film records of interrogations,
torture sessions, and executions detail atrocities perpetrated by the Iraqi government. See, e.g.,
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Resolution 688, initially proposed by France, by a vote of 10-3 with 2
abstentions.7' In that document, the Security Council first condemned
"the repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many parts of Iraq,"
and demanded that "Iraq ... immediately end this repression." The
Security Council further urged Iraq to "allow immediate access by
international humanitarian organizations," and appealed to "all member
States ... to contribute to these humanitarian relief efforts. 72 The Secu-
rity Council also demanded that Iraq cooperate with the Secretary-
General toward these ends.
The Security Council added several provisos linking the resolution to
the language of Article 39, perhaps to make sure that its action was
consistent with its powers under the Charter. In particular, the resolution
stated that these human rights violations had consequences "which
threaten[ed] international peace and security in the region." It character-
ized the requested Iraqi compliance with its human rights demands as "a
contribution to international peace and security in the region." Resolution
688 contained in its preamble a rare reference to Article 2(7) of the
Charter. Anti-interventionists may easily claim that Resolution 688 was
a lawful Security Council action in response to a "threat to the peace,"
and thus well within the traditional paradigm of aggression. This conclu-
sion is excessively formalistic. The relevant issue is not whether the
Security Council can do anything it wants, as long as it styles it a "threat
to the peace." Aside from word games, this still is a human rights issue
about Iraq's treatment of its own citizens. A reasonable interpretation of
Resolution 688 is that the Security Council was centrally concerned with
the human rights violations themselves, and the reference to the threat to
peace and security was added for good measure.
When Turkey resisted international appeals to provide aid and
sanctuary for the one million starving and freezing refugees along its
border with Iraq, the United States, Britain, and France announced that
Tom Hundley, Iraq Plotted Genocide of Kurds, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 1, 1992, at 1; Amy Kaslow,
Documents Give Evidence of Atrocities Against Iraqi Kurds, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June
10, 1992, at Al; Jeanne Kirkpatrick, It is Appropriate to Speak of Genocide, WASH. POST,
Mar. 2, 1992, at A17; Jonathan C. Randal, Iraqi Files Point to Mass Deaths, WASH. POST,
Feb. 22, 1992, at Al. A report by Max Van der Stoel, special United Nations investigator, tells
of arbitrary executions of individuals, families, whole villages; of arbitrary arrests and unspeak-
able tortures, including electric shocks, burnings, beatings, rapes, and extractions of teeth and
nails. Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Iraq, U.N. Commission on Human Rights,
48th Sess., Agenda Item 12, at 12-30, U.N. Doc. EICN.4/1992/31 (1992).
71. S.C. Res. 688, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/688 (1991). See generally
Gallant, supra note 56; see also Rodley, supra note 64, at 28-34; David J. Scheffer, Toward
A Modern Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention, 23 U. TOL. L. REv. 253 (1992).
72. S.C. Res. 688, supra note 71.
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they would undertake a humanitarian relief effort to assist the Kurds.
These states interpreted the term "humanitarian organization," referred to
in Resolution 688, to include military forces with the limited and specific
mission of humanitarian assistance. Dubbed "Operation Provide Com-
fort," the relief effort greatly expanded as the scope of the refugee
problem in northern Iraq and southern Turkey became known. An initial
count found 452,000 refugees in ten major and thirty to forty smaller
camps along the Iraq-Turkey border. Disease, starvation, and freezing
temperatures led to an increasing mortality rate among those seeking
sanctuary in Turkey. ? 3 Estimates of deaths from starvation and exposure
among Kurdish refugees fleeing north were in the range of 1,000 per day
during this period.74
As Kurdish refugees made clear their fear of returning to Iraq
without assurances of safety, the governments involved in Operation
Provide Comfort decided it was necessary to establish protected "safe
havens" inside northern Iraq in order to entice Kurdish refugees to return
from the border area with Turkey.75 On April 12, 1991, U.S. Army
Lieutenant General John M. Shalikashvili met with Iraqi General
Nashwan Tahoon and told him to remove all Iraqi ground forces to
locations south of the thirty-sixth parallel and to cease all air operations
north of the parallel or risk the potential use of allied offensive military
force. By the next day, elements of the U.S. Twenty-fourth Marine
Expeditionary Unit and the Tenth Special Forces Group had been airlift-
ed into the town of Zakhu in northern Iraq to secure the surrounding area
and prepare for the construction of refugee repatriation camps; Iraqi
military and government officials quickly ceded control over the area to
the intervention force.
Within weeks of the passage of Resolution 688, thirteen nations had
sent almost 30,000 military and civilian personnel to participate in the
relief mission. U.S. forces numbered 18,285, while other states contrib-
uted an additional 10,962 personnel.76 Military forces were not the only
participants in the operation. Thirty states contributed relief supplies and
fifty non-governmental organizations (NGOs) either offered assistance or
73. Michael E. Harrington, Operation Provide Comfort: A Perspective in International
Law, 8 CONN. J. INT'L L. 635, 644 (1993).
74. See Patrick Tyler, U.S. Scouting Refugee Sites Well Inside Iraq's Border, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 10, 1991, at Al.
75. Harrington, supra note 73, at 644-45.
76. Id. at 645. The other nations who provided military forces to assist in Operation
Provide Comfort included: Australia (75), Belgium (155), Canada (120), France (2,141),
Germany (221), Italy (1,183), Luxembourg (43), Netherlands (1,020), Portugal (19), Spain
(602), Turkey (1,160), and United Kingdom (4,192).
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participated in the operation. On May 13, 1991, General Shalikashvili
turned control of the operation over to the United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Refugees," and by July 15, 1991, the last allied troops had
been withdrawn to Turkey and replaced by United Nations refugee offi-
cials and security forces,78 pursuant to an agreement between the United
Nations and Iraq. 9
While the decision to operate with military forces within Iraqi
territory was considered necessary to avert a large-scale human disaster,
Operation Provide Comfort's expansion was not completely accepted as
legitimate in the international community. For instance, early on,
Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar warned that the planned
intervention would require approval by the Security Council and the Iraqi
government, noting that it posed a clear legal problem, even if there was
no difficulty from a moral point of view. 80
Although the Secretary-General may have had initial reservations
about the scope of the humanitarian mission in northern Iraq, his Sep-
tember 1991 final report to the General Assembly argued forcefully for
a change in the traditional view of state sovereignty in view of the
universal international interest in responding to human rights emergen-
cies:
[Protection of human rights] now involves more a concerted exer-
tion of international influence and pressure ... and, in the last
resort, an appropriate United Nations presence, than what was
regarded as permissible under traditional international law.
It is now increasingly felt that the principle of non-interference
with the essential domestic jurisdiction of States cannot be regarded
as a protective barrier behind which human rights could be massive-
ly or systematically violated with impunity ....
We need not impale ourselves on the horns of a dilemma
between respect for sovereignty and the protection of human
rights.... What is involved is not the right of intervention but the
collective obligation of States to bring relief and redress in human
rights emergencies.8
77. Id. at 646.
78. John M. Brown, Last Allies Pull Out of North Iraq, FINANCIAL TIMES (London), July
16, 1991, at 6.
79. Security Force Pact is Settled With Iraq, Official at U.N. Says, N.Y. TIMES, May 24,
1991, at A8.
80. See Stephen Robinson, The Middle East: Bush and U.N. Chief Clash Over Legality
of Military Move, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Apr. 18, 1991, at 10.
81. Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, U.N. GAOR, 46th
Sess., Supp. No. I, at 5, U.N. Doc. A/46/1 (1991).
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Perez de Cuellar's admission that state sovereignty must occasionally
yield to human rights concerns was an important step for the United
Nations in accepting humanitarian intervention as a principle of interna-
tional law. When the Secretary-General further notes that "the defense of
the oppressed in the name of morality should prevail over frontiers and
legal documents, 82 it becomes increasingly apparent that the official
United Nations view of state sovereignty underwent significant reevalua-
tion in light of the Gulf War and Operation Provide Comfort.
Anti-interventionists argue that the Security Council resolution did
not authorize forcible measures in the Kurdish crisis, but only non-
forcible humanitarian relief action.8 3 Once more, this is just blind adher-
ence to words on paper. While apparently referring to non-forcible
intervention, the context of this resolution reveals that the United Nations
effort relied upon a number of factors which demonstrate that actual or
potential forcible action was contemplated. As David Scheffer has shown,
those factors were: allied military intervention in northern Iraq in its
efforts to create a security zone; allied threats to respond to any Iraqi
operations; the deployment of a United Nations force to protect humani-
tarian relief efforts; and the existence of an agreement with Iraq that
contemplated the possible use of force in case of noncompliance. 4 In the
light of these facts, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that this was a
genuine case of collective humanitarian intervention.
Another strategy to justify Resolution 688 within the old paradigm of
aggression, that is, without introducing the concept of humanitarian
intervention, is to claim that Resolution 688 was adopted in the context
of the series of Security Council resolutions directed at countering Iraqi
aggression. In this view, the action authorized by the Security Council to
protect the Kurds was simply an extension of the enforcement measures
authorized to counter aggression.8 5 Resolution 688 would thus be analo-
gous to Resolution 687, which authorized a sweeping range of measures
regarding the disarming and denuclearization of Iraq - matters that
normally would fall under its exclusive jurisdiction. The argument is that
the "intervention" to protect the Kurds is justified because it is a sequel
to Chapter VII action, which is itself justified as a response to Iraqi
aggression.
82. R.C. Longworth, End of Sovereignty: Nations' Internal Affairs Now the World's
Business, CHi. TRI., Sept. 19, 1993, § 4 at 1, 4.
83. See, e.g., MALANCZUK, supra note 49, at 18.
84. See Scheffer, supra note 71, at 268.
85. See, e.g., Mary E. O'Connell, Commentary on International Law: Continuing Limits
on U.N. Intervention in Civil War, 67 IND. L.J. 903, 907-08 (1992) (arguing that Resolution
688, together with Resolution 678, gave coalition members the authority to use "all necessary
means" to secure peace in the area that included the Kurdish region).
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This interpretation is highly contrived. The Iraqi government perpe-
trated at least two distinct violations of international law: the attack
against Kuwait (a violation of Article 2(4) which triggers Security Coun-
cil action under Chapter VII); and a massive violation of the human
rights of individuals in Iraq, most notably the Kurds. Resolution 688, by
its very terms, was addressed to the latter. Not only did the resolution
peremptorily demand that Iraq stop the repression; it authorized non-
consensual relief measures. Moreover, from the fact that the Security
Council decreed mandatory disarmament of the defeated aggressor (thus
instituting coercive measures on matters that would normally fall within
the exclusive jurisdiction of Iraq) it does not necessarily follow that the
Security Council had the authority to institute coercive measures on any
matter that would normally fall within Iraq's exclusive jurisdiction. In
other words, Resolution 688 does follow logically from the previous
resolutions of the Security Council (especially from Resolution 687
authorizing the use of force as a response to Iraq's refusal to withdraw
from Kuwait.) But we need the humanitarian intervention standard in
addition to the "breach of the peace" standard to justify Resolution 688.
C. The Operation in Somalia, 1992-93
On December 3, 1992, the Security Council unanimously passed
Resolution 794, authorizing a U.S.-led military force to "use all neces-
sary means to establish as 'soon as possible a secure environment for
humanitarian relief operations in Somalia. ' '16 The Somali crisis was
touched off by the power vacuum created when President Mohammed
Siad Barre, the country's longtime dictator, fled the capital city of
Mogadishu in January 1991.87
Barre's departure split the opposition. As various clan militias turned
on one another, the country was effectively divided into 12 zones of
control. A so-called "reconciliation conference" between the warring
factions was held in Djibouti in July 1991 resulting in the selection of
Omer Arteh Qhalib as interim Prime Minister. In reality, however,
Qhalib held no perceptible authority over the Somali faction leaders. By
November 1991, the struggle between the warring factions had escalated
to a full-scale civil war.
On January 11, 1992, Qhalib sent a letter to the Security Council
requesting an immediate meeting to address the rapidly deteriorating
86. S.C. Res. 794, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3145th mtg., at 3, U.N. Doc. SIRES/794
(1992).
87. See Don Oberdorfer, The Path to Intervention, WASH. POST, Dec. 6, 1992, at Al,,
A35. The brief account that follows is borrowed from Jeffrey Clark, Debacle in Somalia, 72
FOREIGN Arr. 109 (1993).
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security situation in Somalia.8" In response to Qhalib's letter, the Security
Council passed a series of resolutions citing Chapter VII of the U.N.
Charter as the basis for United Nations action and implying that an
Article 39 justification for collective military action could be invoked in
the future. The Security Council imposed a complete weapons embargo
on Somalia in January 1992.89 In April 1992; the United Nations Opera-
tion in Somalia (UNOSOM) was established and fifty United Nations
observers were sent to monitor a widely-ignored cease-fire among the
factions.' °
In the summer of 1992, the warring factions in Somalia continued to
disrupt desperately needed relief supplies. The Security Council passed
increasingly aggressive resolutions, eventually asserting in Resolution
767 that "the situation in Somalia constitutes a threat to international
peace and security." 9' In late August, the Security Council passed Reso-
lution 775, which approved airlifts of humanitarian aid and supplemented
UNOSOM personnel levels with a battalion of Pakistani troops to assist
in relief supply distribution efforts.92
The collapse of all governmental authority, combined with drought
and the continuation of traditional clan and sub-clan warfare, led to a
situation of mass starvation.93 Although the United States supplied food
aid through the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and
private voluntary relief organizations, it is estimated that upward of
three-quarters of the United Nations food supplies were confiscated or
stolen by the various factions for their own use or to sell for profit.94 By
September 1992, tons of undistributed food were piling up at the
Mogadishu airport and waterfront, but the ICRC estimated that 1.5
million Somalis faced imminent starvation, and three times that number
were already dependent on external food assistance.95
88. Letter Dated 20 January 1992 From the Charge D'Affaires A. L of the Permanent
Mission of Somalia to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council,
U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/23445 (1992).
89. S.C. Res. 733, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3039th mtg.,' at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/733
(1992).
90. S.C. Res. 751, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3069th mtg., at 2, U.N. Do. S/RES/751
(1992).
91. S.C. Res. 767, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3101st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/767 (1992).
92. S.C. Res. 775, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 311Oth mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RESfl75 (1992).
93. See Jeffrey Clark, Debacle in Somalia: Failure of the Collective Response, in
ENFORCING RESTRAINT: COLLECTIVE INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL CONFLICTS 204, 207, 213
(Lori F. Damrosch ed., 1993).
94. Carla A. Robbins et al., Waiting for America, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 7,
1992, at 26.
95. See Herman J. Cohen, Somalia: U.S. Relief Efforts, in 6 U.S. DEP'T ST. DISPATCH 713
(Sept. 21, 1992).
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In late November, 1992, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali reported
numerous violations of humanitarian law against United Nations relief
workers, including attacks on the Pakistani troops and the shelling of a
World Food Programme ship as it attempted to enter the port of
Mogadishu.96 On November 25th, 1992, U.S. Secretary of State Lawrence
Eagleburger conveyed an offer to lead a multinational force into Somalia
to implement the Security Council's resolutions to Secretary-General
Boutros-Ghali.97
One week later, the Security Council passed Resolution 794; within
days 24,000 U.S. troops had arrived in Somalia to establish, in the words
of the Resolution, "a secure environment for humanitarian relief opera-
tions" as part of Operation "Restore Hope.""8 The distribution of relief
supplies went exceedingly well according to most reports, and several
hundred thousand Somalis, who otherwise would have perished, managed
to survive.99 On May 4, 1993, the United States formally turned the
operation over to the United Nations.
The operation in Somalia took a turn for the worse, however, when
the United Nations mandate expanded to include "nation-building" projects
such as disarming the factions and arresting recalcitrant or uncooperative
faction leaders."°° One particular raid turned deadly when U.S. Army
Rangers and Special Forces soldiers attempted to protect the crew of a
downed U.S. helicopter pilot in a neighborhood controlled by one of the
factions. Eighteen U.S. soldiers died in the ensuing firefight and 75 were
wounded before U.N. armored units could come to their rescue.' 0' In
another incident, several dozen Pakistani troops were ambushed and killed
by gunmen firing automatic weapons while screened by women and chil-
dren. In all, one hundred U.N. peacekeepers died during the operation."°2
Unwilling to sustain additional casualties, the United States withdrew
its forces from Somalia in March 1994, and the U.N. mission's scope
contracted to its original focus on food relief and distribution. UNOSOM
was unable to bring about the formation of a government in Somalia, and
was subjected to increasing hostility from the populace and the factional
96. Letter Dated 24 November 1992 From the Secretary.General Addressed to the President
of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/24859 (1992).
97. David Binder, Bush Ready to Send Troops to Protect Somalia Food, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
26, 1992, at Al.
98. S.C. Res. 794, supra note 86.
99. See, e.g., Goodbye to Somalia, BALTIMORE SUN, Mar. 2, 1995, at 14A.
100. See Mark R. Hutchinson, Note, Restoring Hope: UN. Security Council Resolutions
for Somalia and an Expanded Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J. 624,
634 (1993).
101. James Adams, A Farewell to Arms?, SUNDAY TIMES, Jan. 15, 1995 at 1.
102. Eric Schmitt, Feb. 26-Mar. 4: Bittersweet Finale; Marines Leave the Shores of
Somalia, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1995, § 4, at 2.
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forces. Frustrated, the Security Council voted to gradually withdraw
UNOSOM from Somalia. The last Pakistani U.N. peacekeepers left
Somalia on March 4, 1995 under escort by 1,800 U.S. Marines.
In January 1995, as the United Nations operation in Somalia was
drawing to a close, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali issued a supplement
to his 1992 report An Agenda for Peace.'13 This supplement noted that
United Nations operations were increasingly intra-state rather than inter-
state. For example, of the five peacekeeping operations underway in 1988
only one, representing twenty percent of the total, involved an intra-state
conflict. Of the twenty-one operations established since early 1988,
thirteen (sixty-two percent) involved intra-state conflict. The trend is even
more pronounced in the United Nations' most recent operations. Of the
eleven operations established since January 1992, nine (eighty-two
percent) involve intra-state conflicts.' 4
The Secretary-General also recognized the emergence of a new type
of United Nations military operation based on UNOSOM's mission in
Somalia:
A second qualitative change is the use of United Nations forces to
protect humanitarian operations .... This has led, in Bosnia and
Herzegovinia and in Somalia, to a new kind of United Nations
operation. Even though the use of force is authorized under Chapter
VII of the Charter, the United Nations remains neutral and impartial
between the warring parties, without a mandate to stop the aggressor
(if one can be identified) or impose a cessation of hostilities. Nor is
this peace-keeping as practised hitherto, because the hostilities
continue and there is often no agreement between the warring parties
on which a peace-keeping mandate can be based." 5
Unlike the case of Iraq, there is not even the possibility of appealing
to the catch-all language of Article 39 to justify this humanitarian mission.
The civil war in Somalia did not pose any serious danger to international
peace. The main concern prompting enforcement action by the Security
Council was the extreme situation created by the combination of famine,
death, and disease caused by the civil war; the breach of humanitarian law
by the warring factions; and the general situation of anarchy. Resolution
794 referred to "the magnitude of the human tragedy caused by the
conflict," and "the deterioration of the humanitarian situation."' 6 Most
103. Supplement to An Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the
Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., I 11, U.N.
Doc. A150/60 (1995).
104. Id. at 3.
105. Id. at 5-6.
106. S.C. Res. 794, supra note 86, at 1.
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significantly, the Security Council mentioned the reports of "widespread
violations of international humanitarian law" in Somalia, including the
violence against personnel participating in humanitarian relief. 7 The
Security Council summed up the situation as "intolerable," adding that it
had become necessary to review "the basic premises and principles of the
U.N. effort" in Somalia. This was, of course, a reference to the distinction
between peacekeeping action, which is partly based on consent by the
territorial state, and enforcement action based on Chapter VII of the
Charter. 108
After demanding a cease-fire in the civil conflict, the Security Council,
"[a]cting under Chapter VII," authorized the Secretary-General and
member states to use "all necessary means to establish as soon as possible
a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia."' 09 Of
course, "all necessary means" includes the use of force; while this had
been established in the Gulf War precedent, it was specifically recognized
in Resolution 794 when the Security Council endorsed the recommenda-
tion of the Secretary-General." 0
The import of Resolution 794 is thus not difficult to glean: the
Security Council authorized member states to stop, by force if necessary,
the egregious violations of humanitarian law in Somalia. The Security
Council expressly reaffirmed that the Somali people "bear ultimate
responsibility for the reconstruction of their own country.' But the
message of Resolution 794,was that political groups may not violate the
constraints imposed by humanitarian law when deciding their own political
fate. This is a pristine case of collective forcible intervention to put an end
to a civil war during which warring factions have committed serious
violations of human rights. The resolution's reference to the "call by
Somalia" underscored that the goal was to rescue the Somali people from
the horrors of the war. The Security Council did not merely authorize
intervention to make sure that humanitarian law was respected; it demand-
ed a cease-fire. Under the powers granted to the Security Council by
Articles 25, 39, 41, and 42 of the Charter, this demand is mandatory.
Some may challenge the validity of this precedent for humanitarian
intervention on the grounds that this was not an action to overthrow a
tyrannical government, which is the traditional, although contested,
paradigm of humanitarian intervention. They may emphasize that there
was not even a government in Somalia. Unlike the cases that supporters
107. Id.
108. For a recent description of the distinction, see Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Empowering
the United Nations, 71 FOREIGN AFF. 89, 89-91 (Winter 1992-93).
109. S.C. Res. 794, supra note 86, at '110.
110. Id. at 7.
111. Id. at 2.
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of humanitarian intervention cite, the intervention in Somalia did not aim
at stopping government-directed human rights violations. It is argued that
Resolution 794 is not a valid precedent for the legitimacy of collective
humanitarian intervention.
This argument is not convincing. For one thing, the fact that there is
no government does not mean that there is no state. No one denies
Somalia's status as a state and the Somalis' right to their own state; indeed
this point was expressly underscored by the Security Council. The
intervention, however, punctured the sovereignty of Somalia as a state,
and anti-interventionists need to explain that phenomenon, unless they
concede that the purpose of the non-intervention rule is to protect govern-
ments per se. In addition, this is a case of civil war, a domestic situation
in which foreign intervention is traditionally banned.1 2 Finally, it is impor-
tant to emphasize that "humanitarian law" is no more than the body of
human rights principles that must be respected by all parties in an armed
conflict.1 13 Therefore, an intervention to put an end to violations of
humanitarian law is an intervention to uphold human rights - the human
rights that parties in a war, civil or international, are bound to honor.
Resolution 794 went further by demanding not merely respect for the laws
of war, but an end to the civil conflict itself. It went that far because the
"human tragedy" was caused by the war. In Resolution 794, human
suffering took precedence over state sovereignty, which is precisely the
policy that undergirds humanitarian intervention.
Anti-interventionists again will call attention to the language in the
preamble of Resolution 794, where the Security Council determined "that
the magnitude of the human tragedy caused by the conflict in Somalia"
constituted "a threat to international peace and security."' ! 4 This is a case
that fell squarely within the terms of Article 39 which defines the powers
of the Security Council only in terms of breach of international peace or
threat thereto.
This view wrongly focuses on what the Security Council says instead
of what it does. The Security Council's decisions are governed by
international law. The Security Council runs afoul of the Charter if it
determines that a situation is a threat to the peace when in reality it is not.
The Council does not have discretion (in the strong sense of creating fresh
law) to authorize enforcement measures to address any situation so long
as it invokes the language of Article 39. A defense of Resolution 794
requires postulating a preexisting legal principle that justifies that resolu-
112. See O'Connell, supra note 85, at 908 n.37.
113. See generally RICHARD B. LILLICH & FRANK C. NEWMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND POLICY 667-83 (2d. ed. 1991).
114. S.C. Res. 794, supra note 86, at 1.
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tion, a principle that the international community could invoke as grounds
for the action in Somalia. That principle can only be the power of the
Security Council to authorize forcible measures in extreme situations of
human rights violations. Anti-interventionists would be on surer footing
if they flatly challenged the legality of Resolution 794 because it falls
outside of Article 39 standards, instead of claiming that the resolution is
really about restoring international peace and not about protecting human
rights. In fact, their anti-interventionism becomes empty if they take the
latter position: the Security Council can do as it pleases, provided it pays
lip service to the language of Article 39. There is only a jurisprudential
difference between this position and the position this article defends -
that the Security Council may authorize humanitarian intervention in
appropriate cases. The difference is that I argue that international law
properly interpreted did authorize collective humanitarian intervention at
the time the Security Council was called upon to act on the Somalian
situation. That right was not created afresh by Resolution 794.
The language in Resolution 794 to the effect that the situation in
Somalia had a "unique character" of a "deteriorating, complex, and
extraordinary nature"' 5 does not bar this conclusion. It is obviously true
that the situation was unique and extraordinary, in the sense that only this
kind of extreme situation warrants the collective use of force. This is
perfectly consistent with the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. The
doctrine does not recommend the use of force to remedy every human
rights problem, any more than the doctrine of self-defense recommends
using force to repel every unlawful act. Only serious human rights
violations that cannot be remedied by any other means warrant proportion-
ate collective forcible intervention for the purpose of restoring human
rights, provided that the victims themselves welcome the intervention, as
they did in Somalia.1 6 For example, the Security Council would have
exceeded its powers if it had installed one of the faction leaders in power,
because that would have been inconsistent with the humanitarian character
of the intervention.
That the situation is "unique" thus cannot mean that this was the only
case, the only exception where intervention in the domestic affairs of a
state will ever be authorized; that would mean that the Security Council
did not act on principle. Resolution 794's reference to the uniqueness of
the situation instead means that this was an extraordinary case covered by
a principle that authorizes intervention only in this class of extraordinary
cases; Resolution 794 should not therefore be construed as a precedent for
115. Id. The same language was used by the Security Council in its recent imposition of
non-forcible sanctions against Haiti. See infra, part III.D.
116. S.C. Res. 794, supra note 86, at 2.
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finding a broad grant of power to the Security Council to authorize
intervention in less egregious cases. This interpretation of the "uniqueness"
language was confirmed by the case of Haiti.
D. The Case of Haiti, 1994
The case of Haiti is the most important precedent supporting the
legitimacy both of an international principle of democratic rule and of
collective humanitarian intervention. In 1987, the Organization of Ameri-
can States (OAS) urged Haiti to resume the democratic process through
free elections."1 7 No "sovereignty" limitation or exception was attached
to this resolution. In 1990, Reverend Jean-Bertrand Aristide was elected
President of Haiti with sixty-seven percent of the popular vote." 8 On
September 30, 1991, a military coup removed Aristide from office. While
the Security Council assembled later that day at the request of Haiti's
Ambassador to the United Nations, it did not formally convene to consider
the coup, allegedly because a majority of its members saw the coup as an
internal domestic matter which did not constitute a threat to the peace
placing it within the competence of the Security Council." 9
In contrast to the Security Council's initial inaction, the OAS re-
sponded quickly to the coup. At an ad hoc meeting on October 2, 1991,
the foreign ministers of OAS members formally condemned the coup and
recommended that its members impose economic and diplomatic sanctions
on Haiti. 20 The Security Council convened formally to hear President
Aristide address the Council on October 3, 1991. All members denounced
the coup and expressed strong support for the OAS action but the Council
failed to adopt a formal resolution addressing the coup, reportedly because
China and certain non-aligned states were concerned about increasing
Security Council involvement in affairs traditionally considered domestic
and thus beyond the realm of the United Nations' concern.'2'
117. O.A.S. Permanent Council Resolution, Solidarity With the People of Haiti, O.A.S. Doc.
OEA/Ser.G/CP/RES.489, Doc. 720/87 (1987).
118. Douglas Farah, Carter Makes Return Visit to Wary Haiti: Aristide's Government Fears
Meddling in Vote, WASH. POST, Feb. 24, 1995, at A16.
119. See Anthony C. Arend, The United Nations and the New World Order 81 GEO. L.J.
491, 500-01 (1993). See also Thomas L. Friedman, U.S. Suspends Assistance to Haiti and
Refuses to Recognize Junta, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 2, 1991, at Al.
120. Support to the Democratic Government of Haiti, O.A.S. Res. 1/91, OEA/Ser.F/V.1,
MRE/RES.1/91 Corr. 1 (Oct. 3, 1991), reprinted in Letter Dated 3 October 1991 from the
Permanent Representatives of Ecuador and the United States of America to the United Nations,
U.N. Doc. S/23109, Annex at 2-3 (1991).
121. See U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 301 1th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.3011(1991); Arend, supra
note 119 at 501-02; Paul Lewis, U.N. Stops Short of Haiti Resolution, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1991,
at A8.
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When the General Assembly took up the issue of the Haiti coup it
went further than ever before: it strongly condemned the "illegal replace-
ment of the constitutional President of Haiti" and affirmed as "unaccept-
able any entity resulting from that illegal situation."'22 Here again, there
is neither mention of Haiti's "right" to "choose its political system," nor
any reference to Haiti's sovereignty or self-determination.
The refusal by Lieutenant General Raoul C6dras and Brigadier General
Phillipe Biamby, Haiti's defacto military dictators, to reinstate the demo-
cratically-elected Aristide government, and the continued violent persecu-
tion of Aristide supporters, led the Security Council to finally adopt
coercive measures against Haiti in June 1993. Acting under Chapter VII
of the Charter, the Security Council imposed a mandatory economic
embargo on Haiti. 23 The Security Council's binding resolution expressly
affirmed that the solution to the crisis in Haiti "should take into account
the above-mentioned resolutions of the Organization of American States
and of the General Assembly of the United Nations" - i.e., the restoration
of democracy in Haiti. 24
The strict United Nations sanctions induced the Haitian military junta
to accept a U.N.-brokered agreement in July 1993, known as the Gov-
ernors Island Agreement, which would have returned Haiti to democratic
rule under President Aristide.' 25 Under the terms of Resolution 841 and
the Governors Island Agreement, the United Nations lifted the economic
sanctions on Haiti on August 27, 1993, because the junta had begun
implementing the arrangements for the restoration of democratic rule.'
26
The Governors Island Agreement collapsed, however, when violence
against Aristide supporters resurfaced in September and October of 1993,
reaching a crisis point when pro-junta mobs blocked the debarkation of
troops assigned to assist in the monitoring and modernization of Haiti's
police and military under U.N. Resolution 867.127 On October 13, 1993
the Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 873 which reimposed
122. G.A. Res. 7, supra note 25, at 2.
123. S.C. Res. 841, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3238th mtg., at 3, U.N. Doc. SIRES/841
(1993). This resolution imposed a compulsory embargo on the delivery of oil, petroleum
products, arms, and police equipment, and froze assets of the Haitian government and its de
facto leaders. Resolution 841 expressly relies on the previous OAS and General Assembly
Resolutions.
124. See also S.C. Res. 841, supra note 123, at 2; Clinton Acts to Block Trade With Haiti:
U.S. Backs U.N. With Unilateral Sanctions, 10 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 41, at 1756 (June
16, 1993).
125. Lori F. Damrosch, Recent Security Council Actions Concerning Internal Conflicts:
Economic Sanctions, AM. SoC'Y INT'L L. NEWSL., Jan. 1994, at 1, 2.
126. S.C. Res. 861, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3271st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/861 (1993).
127. S.C. Res. 867, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3282d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/867 (1993).
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the economic sanctions.'28 The Security Council authorized member states
to use military force to enforce the sanctions in Resolution 875 passed on
October 16, 1993.1 29
On July 31, 1994, the Security Council adopted Resolution 940. This
resolution authorized member states "to form a multinational force [and]
.. to use all necessary means to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the
military leadership."' 3 Acting under this United Nations mandate, the
United States and other member states turned up the pressure on Haiti's
military leadership. On September 15, President Clinton delivered an
ultimatum to Haiti's ruling junta via a television address to the American
public. He indicated that diplomatic measures had been exhausted and that
a military invasion was a near certainty. 131 On September 18, former U.S.
President Jimmy Carter, accompanied by Senator Sam Nunn, and former
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell, persuaded the
junta's leadership to agree to surrender power to President Aristide and
to leave the country by October 15. This agreement was reached only
hours before an invasion by U.S.-led multinational forces were to land in
Haiti. 32 The next day 3,000 U.S. troops from the Army's Tenth Mountain
Division landed in Port-au-Prince Haiti, 133 and within a matter of days the
total had swelled to over 20,000 troops.'3
International reaction was almost universally positive to the September
18th agreement and the subsequent United States occupation. The new
Secretary-General of the OAS voiced "deep satisfaction over the agree-
ment, which assumes that political measures and diplomacy will pre-
vail."'' 35 Venezuela was the only Latin American nation to condemn the
United States action in Haiti. 136 After the Haitian military and police
administered random public beatings to pro-Aristide demonstrators during
the first few days of the occupation in full view of U.S. troops, President
128. S.C. Res. 873, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3291st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/873 (1993).
129. S.C. Res. 875, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3293d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/875 (1993).
130. See S.C. Res. 940, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3413th mtg., at 4, U.N. Doc.
SIRES/940 (1994).
131. Haiti's Military Junta Agrees to Step Down; U.S. Recalls Invasion Force, FACTS ON
FILE 673, 673 (1994).
132. Farah, supra note 118, at A16.
133. See Larry Rohter, 3,000 U.S. Troops Land Without Opposition and Take Over Haiti's
Ports and Airfields, WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 1994, at Al.
134. Farah, supra note 118, at A16.
135. Haiti's Military Junta Agrees to Step Down; U.S. Recalls Invasion Force; Aristide's
Return Set, supra note 131, at 674.
136. -Id. (quoting Venezuela's Foreign Minister, Miguel Angel Burelli Rivas, "This is the
16th United States military intervention in Latin America, and it is lamentable").
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Clinton ordered U.S. forces to abandon the original policy of non-interfer-
ence and prevent such violence by anti-Aristide forces. 137
U.S. forces in Haiti met no armed resistance during the initial troop
landing and, until February 25, 1995, suffered no casualties while restoring
democracy and stability to Haiti."'3 The United States officially turned the
mission over to the United Nations on March 31, 1995. Of the 6,000 U.N.
troops, about 2,400 were U.S. personnel. 39
An analysis of Resolution 940 and subsequent events confirms the
conclusions reached in the cases of Iraq and Somalia. The resolution
determined that "the illegal defacto regime" in Haiti had failed to comply
with the Governors Island Agreement and with previous resolutions of the
Security Council. The Security Council expressed its concern with the
"significant further deterioration of the humanitarian situation," and
particularly the regime's "systematic violation of civil liberties." Thus the
Security Council invoked human rights abuses as well as the illegitimacy
of the regime as the operative reasons for authorizing military action.
Unlike the Somalia case, the Security Council did not determine that
the situation in Haiti constituted a threat to international peace and security
while asserting that it was acting under Chapter VII. Thus, this case-study
strengthens the interpretation of the Charter suggested in this article: that
states have accepted serious violations of human rights as grounds for
action by the Security Council under Chapter VII. Resolution 940, like
Resolution 794, refers to the "unique character of the present situation in
Haiti and its deteriorating, complex, and extraordinary nature, requiring
an exceptional response." That the Security Council considered Haiti
another "unique situation" confirms the interpretation of this language
suggested in the discussion of the events in the Somalia case, namely that
Somalia was not a strictly "unique" case, but certainly an "extraordinary"
one, and that subsequent equally "extraordinary" cases can occur - as
shown by the fact that there have been now two such "unique" cases.
What are the possible arguments against treating the Haitian case as
a genuine precedent for collective humanitarian intervention? Anti-
interventionists may argue, again, that in fact the Security Council found
a threat to the peace and thus authorized the military action under the
classic terms of Article 39. To the argument that Resolution 940 does not
even try to characterize the situation in Haiti as a threat to the peace, they
may reply that Resolution 940 refers to previous Security Council
resolutions on Haiti and that in those resolutions the Council did determine
137. Id.
138. Farah, supra note 118, at A16.
139. Id.
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that there was a threat to international peace and security in the region."
This is stubborn adherence to the anti-interventionist thesis even when it
flies squarely in the face of the facts. No one can seriously argue that the
Haitian situation posed a threat to international peace and security in the
region. A more accurate reading of Resolution 940 is that the reference
to threat to the peace in the region in Resolution 841 was unpersuasive
because it reflected neither the facts nor the normative context of the
Haitian situation. For that reason, the Security Council, in Resolution 940,
sensibly abandoned the reference to the language of Article 39.
Another strategy could be to maintain that the United States acted out
of purely selfish motives, not humanitarian ones, either to stop the flux
of refugees or to get rid of a problem in the United States' "backyard."
First, this view confuses psychological motivation with legal justifica-
tion.1 41 Second, this view is inconsistent with the wording of Resolution
940 - the legal grounds for the U.S.-led intervention. Anti-intervention-
ists would have to say that the Security Council simply lied when it
mentioned human rights abuses and the restoration of democracy in the
resolution. More importantly, President Clinton gave the humanitarian
justification of the intervention in his address of September 15, 1994.142
President Clinton referred repeatedly to the atrocities committed by the
Haitian dictators, and not just to the interruption of the democratic process
in Haiti. The President did stress that such atrocities affected United States
interests, but that begs the question of what is the legitimate U.S. national
interest. If one asks why the atrocities affected U.S. interests, a plausible
answer is that the national interest as defined in a broader sense, and not
just in terms of pure national egoism, 43 was affected precisely because
the atrocities were morally intolerable. One could reply that the United
States' national interest was affected by the flow of Haitian refugees into
U.S. territory. 44 This is certainly true but only means that the United
States had a self-regarding motive in addition to its humanitarian motives.
The United States receives a huge flux of illegal immigrants from Mexico
every year, and no one would suggest that such a "refugee problem"
justifies armed action or even non-forcible action against Mexico. The
Haitian "refugee problem" is best defined as "the refugee exodus caused
140. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 841, supra note 123, at 2.
141. See T&6N, supra note 3, at 111-23.
142. Text of President Clinton's Address on Haiti, WASH. POST, Sept. 16, 1994, at A31.
143. People who talk about the national interest tend to have, in my view, a noticeably
narrow definition of what national interest should be and typically is in a democracy. Why
would citizens of a democracy define national interest as only strategic, economic, or political
advantages over other nations? It seems to me that typically, a democratic government also
advances the national interest if it is responsive to the moral indignation that citizens feel when
confronted with serious violations of human rights outside the state's borders.
144. Text of President Clinton's Address on Haiti, supra, note 142.
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by oppression" and not as "the refugee exodus" tout court. Finally, there
is no reason why the existence of mixed motives should blight an
otherwise justified intervention, especially since the Haitian case is one
where the humanitarian motive is overwhelmingly predominant.
Another possible argument is that the action by the multinational force
is not a case of humanitarian forcible intervention. The U.S.-led forces
occupied the country either with the consent of the junta, that is, of the
effective government as required by traditional international law, or with
the consent of the legitimate government, President Aristide, as required
by modern international law. Thus this is a mere case of peacekeeping and
not an enforcement action. This position cannot be seriously maintained.
The position that the junta's consent validates the intervention is deficient
for two reasons. First, it begs the question of the junta as the legitimate
government of Haiti, and thus as the valid consenting agent.' 45 Second,
on these facts, no one can say that the junta validly consented to the
occupation. Their "consent" was exacted by U.S. envoys under the threat
of military invasion.' 46 A cursory reading of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties will suffice to dismiss such an agreement as interna-
tionally binding. 47 The correct legal position is that the overthrow of the
junta was achieved by the threat of force, which would be prohibited by
the U.N. Charter 4 but for the existence of a justification such as hu-
manitarian intervention. Because the language of Resolution 940 ("all
necessary means") includes the use of force, a fortiori it includes the
threat of force. The method followed by the United States is in compliance
with the requirements of necessity and proportionality, since it was the
least intrusive action necessary to achieve the result mandated by Resolu-
tion 940.149 From a moral and political standpoint, the United States
government must be commended for having achieved the desired result
- the restoration of human rights in Haiti - without resorting to open
combat.
The argument that President Aristide consented to the intervention is
more persuasive, yet it is questionable on several grounds. First, it is not
clear that consent was actually given. 50 Second, the position contradicts
145. For a thorough discussion of intervention by consent, see David Wippman, Treaty-
Based Intervention: Who Can Say No?, 62 U. CI. L. REV. 607 (1995).
146. See On the Brink of War, A Tense Battle of Wills, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1994, at
Al, A13.
147. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Jan. 27, 1980, art. 52, 1155 U.N.T.S. 34.
148. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 4.
149. See generally Judith G. Gardam, Proportionality and Force in International Law, 87
AM. J. INT'L L. 391 (1993).
150. For an account of the changes of opinion by Aristide, see Deborah Zabarenko, Aristide
Thanks U.S., Gets Assurances on Haiti, REUTER, Sept. 21, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Non-US file.
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one of the most cherished anti-interventionist dogmas - the principle that
the internationally legitimate government is the one that has effective
control.' 5' Third, a fair reading of Resolution 940 and the statements of
President Clinton and others shows that the legitimacy of forcible action
did not depend on Aristide's legitimacy. Because the situation in Haiti was
much more serious than mere illegitimacy of the origin of the government,
a denial of consent by Aristide would not have sufficed to foreclose the
legality of the collective action, and his consent was not required by
Resolution 940. Finally, if the consent by Aristide is considered valid, that
would only mean that the intervention was overdetermined, that is, jus-
tified under more than one principle.
The only internally consistent argument denying the validity of this
precedent that is also consistent with the facts, is one which characterizes
the whole incident as an ongoing violation of international law where the
Security Council, under political pressure from the United States, over-
stepped its powers under the Charter. This position certainly bites the
bullet and would presumably also deny the legality of the current practice
of the Security Council as exemplified by the other cases discussed in this
article. This argument does have the merit of avoiding verbal sophistry,
but instead faces a formidable challenge: it is not possible to maintain this
view and simultaneously adhere to a positivist conception of international
law where state and United Nations practice are the yardstick of legiti-
macy. The anti-interventionist making this argument must supply policy
and moral reasons why this practice is illegitimate despite the fact that it
seems to satisfy the requirements of "right process.' 52 For example, anti-
interventionists might argue, along the lines suggested by Michael
Walzer, 53 that the Security Council ignored Haiti's communal integrity
- the right of Haitians to resolve their political differences among
themselves - and that Resolution 940 must be seen as a violation of
Article 39 as interpreted in the light of Walzer's principle, M not as an
extension of the permissible grounds for collective action. Such a position
is morally false and ought to be rejected. 5 5 States exist primarily to
protect human rights. A government such as the Haitian junta which seizes
151. Of course, this is not fatal to the anti-interventionists, because they may reject the
principle of effective control and endorse instead the right to democratic governance, while
opposing the legitimacy of forcible humanitarian intervention.
152. See Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, 82 AM. J. INT'L L.
705, 706 (1988).
153. See Michael Walzer, The Moral Standing of States: A Reply to Four Critics, in
INTERNATIONAL ETHICS 217 (Charles R. Beitz et al. eds., 1985).
154. Walzer's principle is "always act so as to recognize and uphold communal autonomy."
Michael Walzer, The Rights of Political Communities, in INTERNATIONAL ETHICS, supra note
153, at 165, 181.
155. See TEs6N, supra note 3, at 53-94.
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power by force and turns against its own citizens betrays its very raison
d'9tre and cannot be treated as legitimate. A view that describes govern-
mental murder, rape, and torture as "a process of self-determination" is
simply grotesque and may be dismissed without regrets.
E. The Case of Rwanda, 1994
In another striking example of the changing winds in the United
Nations, the Security Council approved France's proposal to intervene in
Rwanda, by a vote of ten to zero with five abstentions on June 22,
1994. 156 Resolution 929 authorized France to use "all necessary means"
to protect civilians in a violent civil war that had erupted in Rwanda. The
Council also required the French to conduct a "strictly humanitarian...
impartial and neutral" operation, that is, one divorced from the merits of
the dispute between government and Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)
forces.
The crisis in Rwanda was triggered on April 6, 1994, when the
President of Rwanda was killed when his plane was shot down while
approaching the Rwandan capital of Kigali. Although the source of the
attack has not been pinpointed, extremist Hutus are widely suspected of
having carried out the attack."57 The Hutu-dominated Rwandan military,
however, blamed the incident on the minority Tutsis, who constitute
fifteen percent of Rwanda's population.158 Within hours, young French-
trained Hutu militiamen, known as interhamwe, began slaughtering
innocent Tutsis and moderate Hutus by the thousands. The RPF reacted
by quickly restarting its dormant civil war against the Rwandan govern-
ment. 5 9
There were 2,700 U.N. observers already stationed in Rwanda as part
of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) to
monitor a peace agreement between the Rwandan government and the
RPF. They were powerless to stop the killing. Belgium recalled its 440
troops, and the remainder of the lightly-armed observer force stayed in
their barracks after ten U.N. troops from Belgium assigned to guard
Rwandan Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana were brutally hacked
156. See Draft Resolution Concerning the Deployment of A Temporary Multinational
Humanitarian Operation in Rwanda, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1994/737 (1994);
S.C. Res. 929, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3392d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/929 (1994).
157. Raymond Bonner, Shattered Nation; A Special Report: Rwanda Now Faces Painful
Ordeal of Rebirth, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1994, at Al, A14.
158. ld.
159. See Scott Kraft, France's Big Gamble Pays Off in Rwanda, L.A. TIMES, July 16, 1994,
at Al. The civil war between the French-backed, Hutu-dominated government of Rwanda and
the mostly-Tutsi RPF erupted in October 1990. The RPF attacked government forces from
Rwandan refugee bases in Uganda. In August 1993, the government and the RPF signed a peace
accord in Arusha, Tanzania, but the accord was never fully implemented. In November 1993,
over 2,000 United Nations troops arrived to monitor the accord. Bonner, supra note 157, at Al.
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to death during the slaying of the Prime Minister.' 6 By April 18, the
International Committee of the Red Cross had reported that "tens of
thousands" of Rwandans had already been killed. The Security Council
voted on April 21 to reduce the number of U.N. personnel in Rwanda to
270 to prevent additional United Nations casualties in the faint hope that
the carnage would somehow cease.' 6' Soon, hundreds of thousands of
refugees began fleeing to neighboring Tanzania and Zaire.
In early May, when the Security Council realized that the killing
continued unabated, it began to discuss sending a United Nations force
of 5,500 African troops to Rwanda. The Security Council voted on May
17 to increase the authorized force level of UNAMIR to 5,500 troops but
had obtained no commitments from member nations to provide such
forces. 62 On May 31, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali reported to the
Security Council that an estimated 250,000 to 500,000 Rwandan men,
women, and children had already been killed. 63 The Secretary-General
pointed out that in a nation of approximately seven million persons, this
was proportional to the killing of two to four million in France and nine
to eighteen million in the United States.6' The report concluded with a
mix of disgust and anger over the inability of the United Nations to
respond to the crisis:
The magnitude of the human calamity that has engulfed Rwanda
might be unimaginable but for its having transpired. On the basis
of the evidence that has emerged, there can be little doubt that it
constitutes genocide, since there have been large-scale killings of
communities and families belonging to a particular ethnic
group....
In the meantime, it is unacceptable that, almost two months
since this violence exploded, killings still continue. 65
160. Thomas W. Lippman, U.S. Troop Withdrawal Ends Frustrating Mission to Save
Rwandan Lives, WASH. POST, Oct. 3, 1994, at All.
161. See S.C. Res. 912, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3368th mtg., U.N. Doc S/RES/912 (1994);
Bonner, supra note 157, at Al; Pamela Constable, World Response to Rwanda Crisis Ques-
tioned, BOSTON GLOaE, July 28, 1994, at 18.
162. See S.C. Res. 918, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3377th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/918 (1994).
163. Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Rwanda, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess.,
at 2, U.N. Doc. S/1994/640 (1994).
164. Id. at 2-3.
165. Id. at 11.
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A United Nations study subsequently confirmed that Hutu militants were
guilty of genocide against the Tutsis, but no evidence was found that the
Tutsi-led RPF committed the systematic reprisals alleged by the Hutus.1
66
Death did not cease at the Rwandan borders as refugee camps in
Goma, Zaire were swept with outbreaks of cholera taking up to twenty
thousand additional lives. 167 Over the next several weeks, the Security
Council was unable to obtain commitments from member nations for the
needed troops, equipment, logistics, and transportation. The United States,
still reeling from unexpectedly large military casualties in Somalia, flatly
rejected requests for participation in the United Nations force. It generally
opposed the idea of deploying any large United Nations peacekeeping
force to Rwanda while the fighting continued and without having secured
firm commitments from member nations to supply troops and equipment.
The cautious U.S. approach was somewhat justified since over two months
after the genocide in Rwanda had begun, and a month after the Security
Council had authorized an expanded UNAMIR mission in Rwanda, only
Ethiopia had committed a fully-equipped unit. 168 The United States was
also concerned about the potential costs of a large, extended United
Nations mission in Rwanda because the United States is required to pay
over thirty percent of the cost of these missions. 169
On June 19, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali wrote to the Security
Council indicating that it would take several additional weeks before the
expanded UNAMIR troops and equipment would be available for deploy-
ment within Rwanda.' 70 With evidence of the scale of the atrocities in
166. Richard D. Lyons, U.N. Study Accuses Hutu in Rwanda Killings, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
3, 1994, at A17. The United Nations Human Rights Commission investigation concluded that
"there exists overwhelming evidence to prove that acts of genocide against the Tutsi group were
perpetrated by Hutu elements in a concerted, planned, systematic and methodical way." Id.
(quoting United Nations investigator Atsu-Koffi Amega).
167. Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Rwanda, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess.,
at 3, U.N. Doc. S/1994/924 (1994).
168. Julia Preston, U.N. Supports France on Force for Rwanda, WASH. POST, June 22,
1994, at A24.
169. U.S. reluctance to support a major United Nations intervention in Rwanda was based
in large measure on the policy direction contained in Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-
25) signed by President Clinton on May 2, 1994, during the height of the genocide in Rwanda.
PDD-25 spelled out strict guidelines to be considered before the United States' agrees to
participate in any multilateral military operation, including the impact on U.S. interests, the
availability of troops and funds, the necessity of United States participation, congressional
approval, a clear date for United States withdrawal, and acceptable command and control
arrangements. PDD-25 also directed that the United States not approve any new United Nations
operation, with or without U.S. troop participation, unless the crisis represents a threat to interna-
tional peace and security, specifically including starvation among civilians, gross abuses of
human rights, or a violent overthrow of a democratically elected government. Any proposed
objective must lay out clear objectives, the availability of adequate funding and troops, the
consent of the parties to the conflict, and a realistic exit strategy. See Thomas G. Weiss, The
United Nations and Civil Wars, 17 WASH. Q., Autumn 1994, at 139, 153.
170. See Letter Dated 19 June 1944 From the Secretary-General Addressed to the
President of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1994/728 (1994).
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Rwanda mounting - a United Nations report estimated that three million
Rwandans were displaced internally and more than two million had fled
to neighboring countries' - the French government sent the Security
Council a proposal for unilateral intervention to halt the bloodshed and
establish safe havens for the hundreds of thousands of fleeing refugees.'72
By June 22, three days after the Security Council approved the French
intervention, 2,500 French troops were in Rwanda and neighboring Zaire
establishing safe havens for refugees near the border. French troops helped
distribute relief supplies and* patrolled the countryside in tanks and
armored vehicles.
While critics of the intervention had expected French forces to assist
Rwandan government troops in the fight against the RPF, as France had
done in 1990, French troops stood aside as the RPF seized control of
Kigali on July 4. French forces also did nothing to prevent the fall of
Butare, Rwanda's second largest city, to RPF forces on July 5, or the fall
of Ruhengeri, the Rwandan government stronghold, on July 14. On July
17, retreating government forces were routed by the RPF at Gisenyi, and
on July 18, the RPF declared a unilateral cease-fire, effectively ending the
civil war. On July 19, the RPF formed a government of national unity in
Kigali. 73 French forces withdrew from Rwanda after two months, urging
the United Nations to send replacements as soon as possible.,74 By August
1994, several thousand blue-helmeted U.N. troops from Ethiopia, Ghana,
and Zimbabwe had replaced the French troops.
There is little doubt that the U.N.-authorized French mission is best
described as a case of legitimate humanitarian intervention. Many of the
arguments presented in the previous sections apply here as well. The
United Nations resolution authorized the use of force, and while there
were references to a "threat to international peace and security," it is quite
obvious that the purpose of the mission was to stop the atrocities taking
place in the Rwandan civil war. It is also worth noting the relative
disinterestedness shown by the French government, as evidenced by its
prompt withdrawal. Unfortunately, the situation in Rwanda has not been
completely alleviated. The fact that the operation was not entirely success-
ful does not impair its legitimacy, however - final success is not a
requirement of right action.
171. Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Rwanda, supra note 167, at § 8.
172. See Letter bated 20 June 1994 From the Permanent Representative of France to the
United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc.
S/1994/734 (1994).
173. Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Rwanda, supra note 167, at 1.
174. Paul Lewis, France Calls Rwanda Mission a Success: Asks for U.N. Force, N.Y.
TiMES, July 11, 1994, at A8.
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F. The Intervention of NATO in Bosnia, 1995
The complicated conflict in the former Yugoslavia created one of the
toughest dilemmas for the Western alliance at the end of the Cold War.
Much has been written about this tragic war, which fortunately seems, at
the time of this writing, to have come to a close.' In this article, I will
focus on only one aspect of it: the legitimacy of the NATO air operations
against Bosnian Serb positions. This is another instance of collective
humanitarian intervention, notwithstanding the fact that the operations
were also intended to force the Bosnian Serbs to negotiate for peace.
Yugoslavia was formed around a Serbian core during a series of wars
in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as the Ottoman Empire gradually
lost control of the Balkan territories. 76 After the fall of the Communist
government, the republics that made up Yugoslavia started down the path
toward secession. Croatia and Slovenia proclaimed their independence on
June 25, 1991.' 7 In Bosnia-Herzegovina, a referendum was held on
February 29 and March 1, 1992, in which more than sixty-two percent of
the voters favored independence. ' The government declared independence
on March 3, 1992. Almost immediately, rebel Bosnian Serb forces began
violent efforts to overthrow the government, and the infamous practice of
"ethnic cleansing" began. 79 The atrocities that were reported were of
comparable gravity and magnitude to those committed by the Nazis in
World War 11.18°
175. For a general history of the region, see VLADIMIR DEDIFER ET EL., HISTORY OF
YUGOSLAVIA (Marie Longyear ed. & Dordija Kreder trans., 1974). The literature on the war
in Bosnia is voluminous. See generally EDGAR O'BALLANCE, CIVIL WAR IN BOSNIA 1992-1994
(1995); Anthony D'Amato, Peace v. Accountability in Bosnia, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 500 (1994);
Jon E. Fink, From Peacekeeping to Peace Enforcement: The Blurring of the Mandate for the
Use of Force in Maintaining International Peace and Security, 19 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE
1 (1995); Gideon A. Moor, The Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Article 51: Inherent Rights
and Unmet Responsibilities, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 870 (1995); Symposium, War Crimes:
Bosnia and Beyond, 34 VA. J. INT'L LAW 255 (1994); A. Mark Weisburd, The Emptiness of
the Concept of Jus Cogens, as Illustrated by the War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 17 MICH. J. INT'L
L. 1 (1995).
176. For an account of the conflict, see Chronology of Conflict in Former Yugoslavia,
REUTER, Oct. 12, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnws File.
177. Chuck Sudetic, 2 Yugoslav States Vote Independence to Press Demands, N.Y. TIMES,
Jun. 26, 1991, at Al.
178. See Tim Judah, Bosnian Leader Warns Serbs to Respect Vote Verdict, THE TIMES(London), March 4, 1992, at 8.
179. See Russel Watson et al., Ethnic Cleansing, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 17, 1992, at 16. On
"ethnic cleansing" generally, see NORMAN L. CIGAR, GENOCIDE IN BOSNIA: THE POLICY OF
"ETHNIC CLEANSING" (1995); on the horrendous crimes against women, see MASS RAPE: THE
WAR AGAINST WOMEN IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA (Alexandra Stiglmayer ed. & Marion Faber
trans., 1994).
180. They included: A massacre of 200 Muslim men and boys by Serb police in Central
Bosnia, see Mary Battiata, Slayings in Bosnia Confirmed: Detained in Convoy Killed, Police
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The first time that the Security Council contemplated authorizing
coercive measures to deal with the conflict was in the summer of 1992.
In Resolution 770, the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII, called
upon states "to take nationally or through regional agencies or arrange-
ments all measures necessary to facilitate in coordination with the United
Nations the delivery ... of humanitarian assistance ... in ... Bosnia-
Herzegovina."'18' While recognizing that the situation in Bosnia amounted
to a "threat to international peace and security," the Security Council was
likewise "deeply concerned" by the reports of abuses against civilians. An
examination of the debates surrounding the adoption of this resolution
brings out two points: first, there was no doubt that the resolution properly
authorized the use of force; second, the commission of atrocities was
foremost in the minds of the delegates and was thus a powerful motivation
for their votes. It is abundantly clear from the debates that the Council
members endorsed the doctrine of humanitarian intervention." 2
The following year, the Security Council was faced with the failure
of several efforts directed at protecting the Bosnian Muslim population.
On October 9, 1993, the Security Council imposed a "no-fly" zone over
Bosnia in order to prevent Serbian assaults from obstructing the transfer
of humanitarian aid supplies. 83 When this proved difficult to enforce, the
Security Council authorized member states to take "all necessary measures
in the airspace of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the event
of further violations to ensure compliance with the ban on flights."'8 4 The
Security Council referred to Resolution 770, and there was wide agree-
ment on the need to put an end, by force if necessary, to the victimization
Say, WASH. POST, Sept. 28, 1992, at Al; murder of 2,000 to 3,000 Muslims by Serb irregulars;
summary executions, see Estelle Lander, New Reports on Atrocities, NEWSDAY, Nov. 7, 1992,
at 4; and widespread rape as an instrument to fulfill the goal of ethnic cleansing, see Lance
Morrow, Unspeakable, TIME, Feb., 22, 1993, at 48. A moderate estimation places the number
of raped women at 20,000, see Elaine Sciolino, In Bosnia, Peace at Any Price is Getting More
Expensive, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 1993, at D4.
181. S.C. Res. 770, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3106th mtg., U.N. Doc. SIRES/770 (1992).
The resolution was adopted by 12 votes in favor and three abstentions (China, India, and
Zimbabwe).
182. See, inter alia, the statements by representatives of Ecuador, Provisional Verbatim
Record of the Three Thousand One Hundred and Sixth Meeting, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., plen.
mtg., at 9, U.N. Doc. SIPV.3106 (1992) (Security Council authorizes states to use force to
ensure delivery of humanitarian assistance); and India, id. at 11-15 (desperate plight of the
population demands urgent response which cannot exclude use of force). Even delegates who
were skeptical about authorizing individual states to act (as opposed to undertaking a collective
United Nations effort), conceded that the situation warranted the use of force. See, e.g., the
statement by the delegate of Zimbabwe, id. at 14-17.
183. S.C. Res. 781, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3122d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/781 (1992).
See generally Timothy McIlmail, No-Zones: The Imposition and Enforcement of Air Exclusion
Regimes Over Bosnia and Iraq, 17 LoY. L.A. INT'L & COmp. L.J. 35 (1994).
184. S.C. Res. 816, U.S. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3191st mtg., at 4, U.N. Doc. SIRES/816(1993).
This resolution was adopted by 14 votes in favor and one abstention (China).
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that (for the most part) Bosnian Serbs were inflicting on civilian popula-
tions. 1BS Pursuant to both of these resolutions, NATO air forces conducted
a series of bombings and other military actions against Bosnian Serb
positions. Partly as a result of the NATO demonstrations, the warring
parties initiated peace negotiations which concluded in the accord signed
in Paris in December 1995.
The intervention by NATO can be explained in part as a humanitarian
effort, that is, as an action undertaken by the military alliance authorized
by the United Nations with the purpose of putting an end to the intolerable
human rights violations taking place in the war. While the initial United
Nations authorization to use air power seemed to be limited to securing
the delivery of humanitarian assistance and the enforcement of the "no-
fly" zone, the NATO intervention far exceeded those limited purposes.
Indeed, the strongest action by NATO took place as a response to the
Bosnian Serb shelling of a Sarajevo market that killed 37 people. 8 6 A few
days before that, the United Nations Rapid Reaction Force on Mount
Igman outside Sarajevo had turned its heavy 155mm guns on the Serbs.'87
This incident illustrates the difficulties of insisting upon the neutrality
or impartiality of humanitarian actions. This concept, as used by the
relevant actors and observers, is highly ambiguous in contexts such as
Bosnia. The prospective intervenor faces two types of problems. One is
what we could call the territorial issue, that is, the merits of thedispute.
What is the relative merit of the claims put forth by the different groups?
Who has the right to what part of the territory? Is secession justified?
These are difficult questions and it is certainly the case that anyone
contemplating intervention must be neutral or impartial as to them. The
second kind of problem is the one posed by human rights violations,
including violations of humanitarian law and the practice of "ethnic
cleansing." As to this problem, there is no such thing as neutral or
impartial humanitarian intervention, and nor should there be. The inter-
vention must target the culprits, whoever they are, and force them to
desist. If there are culprits on both sides, then both must be stopped.
Supporters of neutrality and impartiality cannot legitimately mean that
torturers and their victims are equal as to that issue, the issue of torture.
Maybe they both must be heard on the territorial question, yet the flaw
185. See, inter alia, the statements by delegates from the United States, Provisional
Verbatim Record of the Three Thousand One Hundred and Ninety-First Meeting, U.N. SCOR,
48th Sess., plen. mtg. at 19-21, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3191 (1993) (international community resolved
to enforce Security Council resolutions against those who commit unspeakable violations of
human rights); France, id. at 3-5 (use of force authorized to enforce flight bans); Cape Verde,
id. at 13-15 (Security Council must use its authority to put an end to the tragedy of the Bosnian
people); Pakistan, id. at 17 (citing abhorrent campaign of "ethnic cleansing").
186. Roger Cohen, Conflict in the Balkans: The Overview; NATO Presses Bosnia Bombing,
Vowing to Make Sarajevo Safe, N.Y. TiMEs, Aug. 31, 1995, at Al.
187. UN Returns Fire on Serbs After Shells Blast Sarajevo, CHI. ThIB., Aug. 23, 1995, at 6.
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in the traditional United Nations "peacekeeping" approach, and the reason
why it has been relatively ineffective, is that it insists upon neutrality and
impartiality between the abusers and their victims. In Bosnia, the logic of
the situation forced the intervenors to ignore directives on impartiality and
to take sides, decisively and in my view correctly, in defense of the
victims. Such an action need not prejudge the merits of the dispute,
although in some cases, it can be argued that perpetrators of crimes against
humanity should lose their normal right to participate in the process of
self-determination. Like other cases of humanitarian intervention, the
intervention in Bosnia was overdetermined: it could easily be justified as
an action both to restore peace and to stop the atrocities that had been so
well documented. The human rights situation in Bosnia was one of the
rationales of the. intervention; it also greatly increased the urgency for
collective action.
IV. COLLECTIVE HARD INTERVENTION
Under the international regime of countermeasures, states have the
right to take proportionate non-forcible actions against other states who
have violated a legal right of the state that adopts the measure. 8 A
fortiori, international organizations have the power to adopt coercive but
non-forcible enforcement measures against states which refuse to abide
by their international obligations. The extent and nature of these powers
will depend on the constitutive instrument of the organization. In the
United Nations context, the operative provision is Article 41 of the U.N.
Charter, which authorizes the Security Council to adopt "measures not
involving the use of force" as enforcement means to restore peace and
security. The question is whether the Security Council may authorize
Article 41 measures against a state whose government has rendered itself
guilty of serious human rights violations.
The analysis in the-preceding section applies here even more strongly.
If the Security Council has the power to authorize the use of force to
remedy serious human rights violations, it has, a fortiori, the power to
authorize measures that do not involve the use of force but do involve
more than just discussion or recommendation.
The three most important precedents of sanctions imposed under
Article 41 concerned domestic situations. The first is the Rhodesia case. 89
This was an international issue of course, but the chief concern of the
United Nations was the racist character of the Rhodesian state, not the
vague "threat to international peace" that such situation could create. The
188. See generally ELISABETH ZOLLER, PEACETIME UNILATERAL COUNTERMEASURES (1984).
189. See generally VERA GOWLLAND-DEBBAS, COLLECTIVE RESPONSE TO ILLEGAL ACTS
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: UNITED NATIONS ACTION IN THE QUESTION OF SOUTHERN RHODESIA
(1990).
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second precedent of hard intervention was the case of apartheid in South
Africa. While the threat to international peace was perhaps more genuine
in this case, the Security Council imposed a series of sanctions against
South Africa for its persistent enforcement of the regime of apartheid
within its borders. These two precedents have been important in putting
to rest the argument that Article 41 action ought to be reserved solely for
breach or threat of international peace.
The third, and most persuasive, recent example of collective hard
humanitarian intervention was the imposition of Article 41 measures
against Haiti in response to the interruption of the democratic process in
that country.190 This is an excellent case to test the credibility of the
formalist position: was the Security Council really imposing Article 41
measures against Haiti to remedy a threat to international peace and
security? Or was it instead imposing such measures as a reaction to the
violation of human rights? Again, formalists are content with the first
explanation, provided that the Security Council uses Article 39 language.
This amounts to admitting that the Security Council can characterize any
situation as a threat to peace as long as it parrots the language of Article
39. But if one looks at what the Security Council is doing, rather than at
what it is saying it is doing, there is no doubt that the second explanation
is the correct one.
There is little doubt that today the Security Council can authorize the
imposition of economic and other sanctions against states that commit
serious human rights violations. But the powers of the Security Council
are governed by the Charter and customary law. First, under the principle
of necessity, the Security Council is legally required to adopt non-forcible
measures before it authorizes the use of force. Second, under the principle
of proportionality that governs all countermeasures, sanctions under Article
41 ought to be reserved for situations of commensurate gravity. In the case
of humanitarian intervention, the violations of human rights need to attain
a substantial degree of gravity before the Council can authorize or institute
sanctions. The powers of the Security Council are, therefore, subject to
the customary law of countermeasures.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
In this article I have attempted to demonstrate the legitimacy of
collective humanitarian intervention. I distinguished between three
meanings of the concept of intervention: soft intervention, hard interven-
tion, and forcible intervention. I showed that the domain reserved to the
exclusive jurisdiction of the state is quite small. International law has
evolved to the point that matters which would have been unthinkable for
190. See supra part III.D.
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states to have relinquished only twenty years ago are now subject to
international scrutiny. The most recent and exciting development in this
field is the recognition of the principle that requires democratic legitimacy.
Additionally, I have shown that the principle that the international
community has a right to intervene to uphold basic human rights is
supported by the recent practice of the United Nations, in particular by
the precedents of Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, and Bosnia.
The end of the Cold War is, of course, the mandatory topic today.
Historians, politicians, political scientists, lawyers, and philosophers are
attempting to make sense of what happened and why it happened. But
surely at least one thing is clear: there would have been no end to the
Cold War without the moral defeat of tyranny, without the resolve of the
liberal alliance to resist the internal and external pressures of the various
enemies of freedom. As Kant rightly argued, democracy and human rights
are the only morally defensible foundation of international law. Internal
freedom, respect for democracy, and human rights are the features which
make states less aggressive, not the other way around. It is a mistake to
believe that once states become peaceful they will then turn democratic.
On the contrary, only democratic states have a chance to maintain a
peaceful and stable international system for a long period of time. The rise
of collective humanitarian intervention and the shrinking of traditional
conceptions of sovereignty and domestic jurisdiction are essential for the
preservation of peace in the new international order. Conversely, if we
lose the battle for democracy and human rights, we necessarily lose the
battle for peace and security. The lesson is, perhaps, that the gradual
dilution of state sovereignty is not just one more historical phenomenon,
one more stage in the unfolding of blind Laws of History over which we
lack control. It is, rather, a moral imperative.
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